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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In comparing the evolution of the current struggle between religious challengers and 
the ruling class in Algeria and Turkey, this paper examines why and how Algerians became 
involved in a civil war which has continued almost six years, and why Turkey was not like 
Algeria. In order to carry out this investigation, the following research questions are 
developed: What key factors favored or discouraged the use of violence in both countries? 
Since religion in and of itself does not lead to intolerance, what are the key factors that 
nourished the deviant interpretation? What is the impact of the sociopolitical cultural 
heritage of each country regarding violence and how people behave and act in a conflict? 
And what is the Islamic perception on extremism, violence, and terrorism? 
In the light of available evidence, the research deals with the reinterpretation of 
traditional Islamic concepts such as jahiliyyah, takfir, jihad, and separation that are the key 
terms in the explanation of the different responses given by the Islamic groups and 
movements in Algeria and Turkey. The findings show that the internal political conflict in 
both countries was the outcome of different re- interpretations and understandings of these 
concepts.  In the reinterpretation of these concepts and in the response to secular repression, 
the sociopolitical cultural background of each country also has a considerable impact.  
The paper also analyzes the Islamic perceptions on the extremism, violence and 
terrorism at this time. In the conclusion, the paper points out some possible considerations 
for policy makers.  
 
 vi 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
 It is time that Saturns ceased dining off their children; time,  
 too, that children stopped devouring their parents… 
      Alexander Herzen 
 
The emergence of reactionary thought in the late nineteenth century in the Islamic 
world rose against a background of foreign occupation, cultural disarray, economic ruin, and 
as a response to the criticism toward Islamic ideals.  After World War I, two kinds of 
nationalism flourished among the people of the Muslim realm, occupied and colonized at 
that juncture by the European powers: a secularly oriented nationalism and a religiously 
imbued nationalism. According to the secularist nationalism protagonists, Islam was no 
longer relevant as a source of philosophic, social or political truth. Islamic practices, the 
secularists argued, were to be relegated to the sphere of private piety and morality. On the 
contrary, religiously imbued nationalists, unified under the aegis of pan-Islamic and later an 
Arab-Islamic, emphasized the positive role of Islam and opted for an Islamic solution against 
the Western influences and archetypes (Esposito 1991; Kombargi 1998).  
 In the decades immediately following independence, most Muslim societies and 
governments turned to their Western allies for development models. The majority of Muslim 
countries pursued Western-oriented and increasingly popular secular paradigms and 
maintained such views on the religious matters, according to which the religion should be 
“restricted to personal life or administered by the state” (Esposito 1997:2). That paradigm 
would soon produce the conflict between “secularism” and “Islamism” in the Islamic world 
and beyond. The intensification of the secularizing influence on the Islamic agenda, on the 
one hand, has resulted in the current political-religious competition that has produced 
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varying effects on both sides. On the other hand, secularization policies caused the rise of 
political Islam in the Islamic world, particularly after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Thus, 
the radical and violent acts in most post-colonial countries in the Muslim world, particularly 
in Algeria were the result of a dichotomous conflict between the Islamists and secularists. 
The present struggle between the state and its religious challengers is linking the ideological 
competition between religious and secular ideas to how the state and society should be 
constructed.  
1.1. Statement of the Problem 
 The newly independent Muslim countries, from North Africa to South Asia, turned to 
their Western supporters for developmental models. At the same time, those young actors in 
the international arena also experienced some “infiltration of foreign powers and alien 
cultures” into their Muslim societies and governments (Esposito 1991:37). Many states, such 
as Algeria, Egypt and Iraq, appealed to Islam as a potential basis for their post-colonial 
independent policies. By this they sought, among other things, “to enhance their legitimacy 
and authority, strengthen nationalism, and legitimate or mobilize popular support for their 
programs and policies” (Esposito 1991:52). Hence, Islamic movements and organizations in 
those regions “have increasingly clashed with regimes in power” (Esposito 1997:4).  
Over time, an enormous tension between the regime in power and religious masses 
became one of the major problems of the secularly oriented states. This problem was viewed 
as a fluctuating chasm between more secularism and less Islamism or less secularism and 
more Islamism (Vergin 1996).  
Accordingly, the failure of the secularism-oriented states to create a cohesive state 
and society after the independence resulted in the rise of political Islamic identities. As a 
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result, a number of revivalist groups emerged to take action against the secularization and 
repression on the religious practice by the masses as well as by political figures. The reaction 
for the state’s social and public policy gave the ruling elite a sense of insecurity that 
translated itself into systematic violations of human rights.  
In this context, Turkey and Algeria share some similarities in the patterns of 
evolution in their religious and historical paths as well as in their cultural dynamics. At the 
same time, their political culture and characteristics of their opposition movements in 
historical perspective differ considerably. A comparative study of the two countries’ patterns 
of evolution and their political cultures explains the factors that give impetus to the 
emergence and development of religious radicalism in politics. In this paper I will examine 
why and how secular state policies (defined in Appendix A) that have led Algerian Islamic 
groups to a radicalism and violence did not produce the same results in Turkey.  
1.2. Significance of the study: Research questions and hypothesis 
 In an attempt to explore and understand the broader political implications of the 
competition between secularization and Islamization in the political sphere, this study 
focuses on the cases of two states of the Islamic world: Turkey and Algeria. I did the 
comparative analysis in order to understand why the same factors in Turkey did not produce 
an explosion as they did in Algeria. In order to carry out this investigation, I have provided 
background information about each country that will play a considerably significant role on 
how people give a response to the internal conflict. I also examined the emergence of the 
Islamic political alternative in each country and analyzed each country’s reaction to Islamic 
groups and the Islamic groups’ responses. Finally, I have compared the findings in the 
theoretical context of Islamic thought, movements, and political cultural heritage.  
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In doing this, the following questions guided my investigation of the 
aforementioned problem throughout the thesis:  
· What key factors favored/discouraged the use of violence by Islamic groups in 
the two countries?  
· What is the impact of sociopolitical and cultural heritage in the responses to 
secular repression in Algeria and Turkey?  
· What is the answer of Islam to the repression, violence and terrorism?  
 Conflict and nonviolent social change theories have been put forth by Islamic social 
scientists such as John L. Esposito, Bassam Tibi, John P. Entelis, John O. Voll, Muhammad 
Said al-Ashmawy to explain why the reaction of the Islamists to the repression and secular 
state policies was not the same in the Muslim world. The most significant of the conflict and 
nonviolent social change theories are related to the different interpretations of Islam in 
Turkey and Algeria. Because of the different interpretations of Islam, the reactions of 
Muslims to the policies of their states have resulted in non-violence in Turkey but violence 
in Algeria. This explanation will constitute my basic hypothesis. 
 In this context, my work is the first in its field and different from other research done 
on the Islamic world. This study provides a comparative analysis of Turkey and Algeria and 
contributes to a new understanding of the struggle and competition between secularism and 
Islamism in both countries. Furthermore, the research is beneficial in defining the key factors 
that shape the relationships between Islamic organizations and/or movements and the state. 
There is a general sense that events in the contemporary Muslim world, especially 
after the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, have led to an explosion of 
interest and scholarly work on Islam and the Muslim world. This renewed interest and 
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scholarly work focus on political Islam or Islamism and Islamic organizations and 
movements that have become major social and political players in society.  
This study results in some policy recommendations for a new U.S. foreign policy. 
Popular misconceptions about the Islamic faith and movements often exacerbated by the 
media and popular culture have made it particularly difficult to challenge U.S. policy in the 
North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. In this research, pure Islamic practice and 
hermeneutics prevail contrasting the realities of Turkey and Algeria. Thus, the study can 
help policy makers to resist the temptation to use false conceptions of Islam and Islamic 
movements as the basis for policy making.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter deals with looking into available literature that covers the interpretation 
theory, the development of Islamic hermeneutics, political Islam or Islamism, and Islamic 
movements.   
2.1. Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory 
 Hermeneutics, in its broadest sense, describes the interpretation of meanings –
explication, clarification, analysis, and commentary. Originally applied to the interpretation 
of the Bible, hermeneutics comprises pointed readings plus exegesis –commentary on how 
the interpretation is applied to the texts.  
 The modern hermeneutics as the “science” of interpretation was developed from 
Friedrich Schlemiermacher (1768-1834), through Wilhelm Dilthey to Hans Georg Gadamer, 
Paul Ricoeur, and other modern representatives. Two dominant theories emerged from 
Dilthey’s (1900) original premise. These are that of E. D. Hirsch (1967) who, in accord with 
Dilthey, felt a valid interpretation was possible by uncovering the work’s authorial intent, 
and, in contrast, that of Martin Heidegger (1927), who argued that a reader must experience 
the “inner life” of a text in order to understand it at all. For Heidegger or Gadamer (1976), a 
valid interpretation may become irrecoverable and will always be relative. Gadamer 
develops a hermeneutics according to which the meaning of any text is a function of the 
historical situations of both author and interpreter. Since each reading is grounded in its own 
context, no reader can offer a definitive or final interpretation of the texts; the virtual 
dialogue continues indefinitely.  
 Richard Palmer’s book, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher,  
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Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (1969), made a meaningful contribution to the theoretical 
understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey developed Friedrich Schleiermacher’s (1977) idea of the 
hermeneutic circle, which was the paradox that emerges from the fact that the reader cannot 
understand any part of the text until she or he sees the hermeneutic circle as non-vicious. A 
valid interpretation involves a correct construal of the author’s willed meaning. Such a 
construal takes into account the author’s purview or perspective, his or her horizon of 
expectations –generic, cultural, and conventional. For Hirsch, verbal meaning is stable and 
determinate. By contrast, Heidegger and Gadamer insist on the historicity and temporality of 
interpretation. For them, meaning is always codetermined, the reader’s horizon of 
expectations attempting to fuse with the author’s. An inescapable relativity and 
indeterminacy is thereby introduced into the notion of interpretation. 
 Another important scholar who made a contribution to the interpretation theory is 
Paul Ricouer with a work titled The Conflict of Interpretation: Essays in Hermeneutics 
(1974). Ricouer’s interpretation theory seeks a dialectical integration for Dilthey’s 
dichotomy of explanation and understanding. He begins by distinguishing the fundamentally 
different interpretive paradigms for discourse (written text) and dialogue (hearing and 
speaking or recorded text).  
2.2. Understanding of Islam 
According to Islamic beliefs, the Qur’an, the Holy Book of Muslims, was revealed 
by God to the Prophet Muhammad (570-632 A.D.) through the Angel Gabriel during the 
twenty-two years of Muhammad’s messengership between the years 610-632. The role of 
the Prophet Muhammad in codifying Muslim learning should not be underestimated. In 
principle, “everything” is in the Qur’an so; Muslims can derive the inspiration and impetus 
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for their lives from this divinely revealed source.  However, an enormous number of details 
concerning Islamic practice can be found only in the Hadith. Hadith refers to the Sunnah that 
is the recording of what Prophet Muhammad said, did or acted upon.  
After the Prophet’s death, the next generation named Tâbi’ùn had not personally 
conversed with the Prophet Muhammad like the Companions named Sahâbah who 
witnessed the coming of the revelations (vahy) –and therefore needed explanations and 
clarifications regarding the verses of the Qur’an or their bearing on problems as they arose, 
or details on certain historical or spiritual matters on which they sought more light. Even 
while the Qur’an was being revealed, the Companions would ask the Prophet all sorts of 
questions, for example, the meaning of certain words in the verses revealed, or their bearing 
on problems as they arose, or details on certain historical or spiritual matters on which the 
people sought more light. The Companions who had learned the Qur’an and its living tafsir 
and ta’wil (which refer to the explanation, clarification, interpretation, and commentary of 
the Qur’an and the Hadiths) from the Prophet himself passed away one by one. As the 
community expended, the vicissitudes of life and fortune meant that the next generation 
came face to face with all sorts of human experience that had to be sorted out. So, issues 
gradually led to the evolution and formation of the Qur’anic science. With the next 
generation, tafsir and ta’wil of the Qur’an became the most important science for Muslims. 
Heavily dependent upon philology, this branch of study is known as the ilm al-Qur’an wa’l-
tafsir or the knowledge of the Qur’an and (its) exegesis.  
All matters concerning the Islamic way of life are connected to the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah of the Prophet in one way or another since the right application of Islam is based on 
an appropriate understanding of the guidance from God. Without commentary and 
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interpretation (tafsir and ta’wil), there would be no a proper understanding of various 
passages of the Qur’an and the Hadiths. This, however, provided the ground for different 
interpretations. For example, influenced by the variation in the classic tafsir scholars, Tafsir 
al-Qur’an al-Hakim (1907-1934) by Abduh and Rida constituted the basis for the notion that 
Islam has to be seen as different from all Western philosophies and must regain its original 
position. This view, underlying the Tafsir al-Manâr, continues to be voiced in the social and 
political arena in the Middle East. Also, Sayyid Qutb’s Fìzilal al-Qur’an (1972) has greatly 
influenced social and political life in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, 
and Algeria. He has had a serious role in the rise of political Islam in these countries that 
were governed by socialist secular establishments in the Arab countries. 
Mawdudi, with his The Meaning of the Qur’an (Tafhim al-Qur’an) (1967), prepared 
the groundwork for political Islamic movements founding the Jamâ’at-i Islâmì (Islamic 
Society Movement) in Pakistan. That movement has played a critical role in overthrowing 
the socialist regime in Pakistan and continues its influence in all Indian subcontinent 
countries.  
However, although some Islamic scholars in Turkey favored such political 
interventions, there were others, such as Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, in his The Collection of 
Risale-i Nur (Risale-i Nur Kulliyati) (1996) and his advocators and successors in the thought 
of the Nur school who categorically opposed the idea of equating religion with politics, 
denying the elements of violence in Islam. 
 Another study that is apt to make a useful contribution to the theoretical 
understanding of our study is Tamara Sonn’s Interpreting Islam: Bandali Jawzi’s Islamic 
Intellectual History (1996). Bandali Jawzi (1872-1942) belonged to a unique generation of 
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Palestinian intellectuals and was privileged to live in the days when Turkish domination 
finally came to an end and Arab Islamic consciousness was coming into full flower. Jawzi’s 
Min Ta’rikh al-Harakat al-Fikriyyah fi’l-Islam (The History of Intellectual Movements in 
Islam) (1928) based on an interpretation of Islam, is the first Marxist interpretation of the 
development of Islamic thought. This work coincides with the period when the Western 
domination of the Middle Eastern and the North African societies began to loosen. 
Therefore, Jawzi’s work played a memorable role in the formation of the Pan-Arab and Arab 
socialist ideologies. Almost all movements for independence in the Arab world presented 
both socialist and nationalist goals in the Islamic context. Algeria’s FLN movement began 
with socialist and nationalist aims for independence. The reactionary characteristic of such 
independence movements in the Arab societies would later continue, even in the postcolonial 
period. 
2.3. Political Islam and Islamic Movements 
Under the influences of tafsir and ta’wil, Islam took many orientations and forms in 
the world: Islamic monarchies and republics; Islamic revivalist and reform movements 
engaging in moral, social, and political activism and participating in society and the state; 
and Islamic opposition organizations and associations based on the confrontation of Muslims 
with foreign traditions (Esposito 1997). 
The term political Islam or Islamism which was relatively fabricated and popularized 
as a scared phenomenon by the myth of the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979 was the result 
of these orientations and forms (Esposito 1997; Bulac 2001). Political Islam or Islamism 
refers to the discourse and activities that give Islam a central political role and aim to 
reorganize society according to what are believe to be Islamic principles and Islamic law 
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(Celik 2002:61). Islamists claim that Islam has prescribed rules for social and political life. 
Therefore, they reject an idea of religion that is confined to individual’s private lives. 
Accordingly, it is viewed as a political ideology that wants to set up an Islamic state with a 
constitutional framework and political organization completely created from the top 
downward (Roy 1994; Esposito 1997; Fuller 2002). 
The confrontation of Muslims with Western traditions by the beginning of the 
twentieth century resulted in three types of reaction in the Islamic world: secular, radical, 
and moderate tendencies (Haddad et al.1991; Esposito, Haddad, Nasr, and Voll 1999). 
Secular tendency has seen the weakening and failure in Islam itself and looked into 
separation of the institutions of religion and state. Radical tendency which is used here 
interchangeably with opposition to secular tendency has been developed as an objection to 
any kind of deviation from what was seen to be orthodox Islam. According to radical 
Islamists, the state cannot shelter simultaneously secular and religious elements in its own 
structure. The Islamic state should be created from the top downwards and if necessary 
through violent action. The radicals are not eager to wait until the society becomes gradually 
Islamized and do not want any compromise with existing regimes (Voll 1991; Roy 1994; 
Esposito 1997). The final group is the moderate Islam that emerged aiming to reinterpret 
Islam to meet the changing circumstances of contemporary life. The moderates focus mostly 
on education and social welfare programs that lead to Islamization of society. For them, 
creating an Islamic state is a natural result of the Islamization process. They are open to any 
political dialogue and insist on staying away from any sort of violence in political conflict 
(Esposito 1997; Abootalebi 1999).  
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 In the classification of the Islamic organizations and movements, Ahmet and 
Zartman categorize two types of movements as radical and moderate with an explanation of 
the distinction. They analyze liberal and secular Islam within the moderate group. They 
argue that “liberal and modernist Islam is one alternative that can emerge as a potential 
challenge to political Islam” (1996:70).  
Abootalebi (1998) proposes a classification of radical (or fundamentalist) and 
moderate Islam (Islamists or Islamic reformists), without mentioning secular or liberal Islam. 
He analyzes the differences among Islamic movements, as well as their contrasting attitudes 
toward democracy. He shows how reality is quite different from the monolithic models often 
presented regarding such ideologies and groups, including the debates among their leading 
activists and philosophers. The concept of Islamist and fundamentalist variations is 
especially useful, and important for analyzing the future direction of such organizations.   
Emad E. Shahin (1998) separates the types of reactions to the governments and 
Western influences in the Muslim world into two categories. One group is “vertical” 
movements that overtly challenge their governments, and the other one is “horizontal” 
movements that focus on society and the renewal of Islamic learning and civilization. The 
above-mentioned Risale- i Nur movement in Turkey, for example, is one of the non-political 
Islamic movements in the world (Yavuz 1999; Aras 2000; Michel 2002). What Shahin 
means by horizontal movements are non-political Islamic groups.  
The scheme for categorizing the Islamic social and political organizations and 
movements, I prefer to use, consists of two categories: moderate (reformist or liberal) and 
radical (fundamentalist) tendencies. This classification will help my investigation of the 
social and political conflict in Algeria and Turkey. 
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After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, understanding of political Islam in regard to 
vertical movements has become more challenging (Esposito 1997). Since the outbreak of the 
Iranian Revolution began to influence the Islamic movements, the literature on political 
Islam and Islamic movements in fact has seemingly failed to make accurate distinctions 
between radical and moderate movements (e.g., Zeidan 2001; Narli 1999; Martin 1999; 
Mortimer 1996; Ayata 1996; Yaphe 1997). The literature commonly focuses on the 
ideological core of the confrontation between state and religious challengers without 
examining their common elements. Political Islam is generally seen as a problem (e.g., Roy 
1994; Narli 1999; Ayata 1996), rather than as a normal response to the faultiness of 
leadership (Shahin 1998).  
Meanwhile, it should be noted here that these classifications of Islamic movements into 
two or three groups “can be confusing, since Islamic doctrine itself allows for different 
interpretations and therefore different opinions on Islamic law (Shari’ah) and its principles” 
(Abootalebi 1998:1). This does not, however, diminish the value of using such 
classifications.  
 Today there are different thoughts and movements that resulted from different 
(literal) interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah (example) of the Prophet Muhammad, such 
as Shii Islam and deeply conservative Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. Despite of the 
classification of the religiopolitical movements, I will examine their influences in the 
religious heritage and political climate in Algeria and Turkey and how they use the 
interpretation to legitimate their agenda and tactics.  
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CHAPTER 3: TURKEY AND ALGERIA: IN SEARCH OF A THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
This chapter attempts to look briefly at the developments and evolutions of the  
ideological vacuum in the formation of the state and Islamic organizations and movements in 
Turkey and Algeria. In doing this, I will attempt to offer a viable framework for 
understanding the relationship between the dependent (the response to secular social and 
public policies of state) and the independent (the differences in the interpretations of Islamic 
movements and groups) variables.  
3.1. Historical foundation for emergence of the modern Islamic movements 
The reform and revivalist movements in the Islamic world first emerged as a 
response to the Western incursion on Muslim lands and the criticism of the Islamic ideals. In 
fact, by the end of the Ottoman Empire’s rise in the eighteenth century, the Islamic world 
experienced political, economic, and cultural decline. In order to get out from this decline, 
many Muslim rulers in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Iran1 tried to emulate the Europe-
centered West by modernizing their military, economy, and education, and by introducing 
modern military training institutions and secular schools staffed with European teachers, 
regardless of their “ignorance” of Islamic values and culture. In the name of modernization 
in the end of the 18th century, they sent educational missions to Europe, where Muslims 
studied languages, science, and politics and introduced European civil codes and national 
and international court systems that continued to exist alongside Islamic ones. Despite their 
Muslim societies, those who were sent to the Western countries accepted a secular outlook 
                                                                 
1 For example, by the late 17 th century, some Sultans of the Ottoman State and Muhammad Ali and his successors who were the Ottoman 
vassals in Egypt, which was later occupied in 1882 by British, had attempted westernization. That westernization was similar to the 
colonized states, such as Algeria by French in 1830, and their post -colonization time. 
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without examining how to modernize their states and Muslim communities. Therefore, the 
coexistence of the different institutions divided the society into two distinct branches with 
divergent world views and prospects for the future: a minority of westernized and 
secularized elite smitten with European civilization, and a religious traditional majority 
(Esposito1995:54; Al-Attas 1996:231-234; Hanafi 1996:243). The Nationalism (Turkism-
Arabism), Westernism, and Islamism (Ottomanism) were the result of the different views 
and prospects that would create the ideological vacuum of how the state and society should 
be constructed. In fact, the great majority of the community structures, today are known as 
Islamic social and political movements, emerged in this period (Esposito 1991; Bulac 1993; 
Baser 1999).  
3.2. The foundation of the Republic of Turkey 
 The Turkish national independence movement after World War I, without doubt, 
began under the Ottoman sultanate and caliphate in 1919 and the Muslim population was 
mobilized under the banner and slogan of the “national struggle” (millî mücadele) which was 
dominated by Islamic “ideal” (mefkûre). After the end of the national struggle and the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, the terms of 
mefkûre and millî which had religious connotations changed their meanings to muasir 
(modern or contemporary) and medenî (civilized) terms which had affiliation with secular 
westernization within the Kemalist cultural transformation known as the “Ataturk 
reforms/revolution”2 between 1923 and 1938 (Zurcher 2000:55-64).  
The transformation of the Turkish society from an Islamic tradition into a secular 
                                                                 
2Ataturk reforms are unique ideology termed as Kemalism, which is a westernization and modernization project that was a kind of state 
religion in its own right. The Turkish Republic was based upon  Ataturk’s six fundamental principles: republicanism (creating the 
republic), nationalism, populism, étatism, secularism, and revolution. The bases of his policies were enshrined in the Republican People’s 
Part y’ program of 1931, which was written into the Turkish constitution in 1937.   
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republic was essential to the process of modernization for Ataturk and his successors. The 
new Republic’s modernization process was linked with the westernization and 
modernization movements (Tanzimat Fermani in 1839 –the first official westernization 
policy that proposed modernization and secularization in the fields of economy, education, 
the legal system as well as equality for all of the citizens of the state— and  Mesrutiyet 
[Constitutional Monarchy] in 1876 –that separated religion and state institutions and brought 
about limitations to the authorities of the Sultan) in the late of the Ottoman Empire. In the 
name of modernization, Ataturk and his successors, like Ismet Inonu, initiated a radical 
reform package to remove the religious components of the state institutions and replace them 
with modern and westernized alternatives. During the first years of the Republic, the new 
regime adapted the Swiss Civil Code, Italian Penal Code, and German Business Law. In 
1924 the new regime abolished the Caliphate (the leadership of the Muslim world), closed 
religious schools and houses (tekkehs and zawiyehs), barred religious orders’ decrees and 
gatherings, and required a specific style dress code for state employees. In 1928 it also 
replaced the Ottoman script with the Latin script and removed the clause referring to Islam 
as “the religion of the Turkish state” from the constitution. The aim of all those changes was 
to diminish the influence of Islamic culture and weaken the power of tradition (Ayata 1996). 
 The new Republic’s secularism was not based upon the separation of the state and 
religion. Rather, Islam as a religion had been “nationalized” and “secularized” by the state. 
The state not only refused any public manifestation of religiosity, but it also monopolized the 
right to organize religious life and to define the context of what a proper understanding of 
religion was. Any interpretation outside the official definitions and any religious formation 
outside state control would therefore be seen as deviant and threatening.  
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 The Kemalist elites3 “were powerfully influenced by French ideas, particularly 
those of French revolutionary Jacobinism … that … carries overtones of irreligion and 
atheism. The advocates of this radical secularism consider Islam a totalist worldview that is 
incompatible with pluralism and democracy. The Young Turks4 (in the Ottoman Empire) 
and their successors, the Kemalists (in the Republic of Turkey) concluded that, just as the 
Catholic Church was said by French liberals to pose a threat to the French Third Republic, so 
did Islam present a threat to modern Turkey. Since Islam does not have an institution that 
functions as a church, their attempt to enforce secularism was transformed into a quasi-
atheist crusade against individuals” (Candar 2000:6).  Therefore, Kemalist elites intended to 
remove all manifestations of religion from the public sphere and put it under the strict 
control of the state. In this respect, the Religious Affairs were established by the state in 
order to control religion and religious life.  
 So, they can be described as “antireligious rather than secular, in accordance with the 
anticlericalism of the radical Jacobins who shaped (their) thinking” (Candar 2000:6; quoted 
in Jeremy Salt 1998). Turkish secularism, Candar writes, is “not as democratic as it appears 
to some Westerners, and Turkish Islam is not as fundamentalist as it is portrayed” (2000:6). 
Secularization policies were spread out of state institutions and invaded the society and the 
individual sphere. Consequently, religion suffered a sharp decline and all institutions of the 
state and structures of the society moved toward more secular bases (Mardin 1989:155). 
                                                                 
3 Advocators and successors of Ataturk’s  the guiding and shaping principles in order to make a modern Turkey. See John Tirman, 
“Ataturk’s Children”. The Boston Review at http//www.photius.com/thus/ataturk.html. 
4Young Turks are number of the army’s reform-minded westernized group to which Ataturk belonged, and educated in Europe, particularly 
in France in the late 19 th century. Their worldview affected the views of both the Society of Union and Progress and the Kemalists. They 
developed the official ideology of the Republic of Turkey. Some of them held religion responsible for the Ottoman Empire’s decline. They 
also defended the Ottoman elite’s adaptation of Positivism which put “science in the place of religion” so that the state could modernize. 
According to them, modernization and Westernization could succeed only by educating people with “true Islam”, which meant presenting 
these concepts as Islamic. For more details, Hanioglu, Sukur. 1995. “The Yong Turks in Opposition: 1889-1902”. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
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 What the Muslim Turkish public did was often condemn the government for not 
observing religious neutrality, as is the practice in France and the US and censure its abuse 
of political power. They have always sought “to redefine laicism (secularism) along more 
Anglo-Saxon lines and to form a more neutral relationship between religion and the state” 
and argued that “the state should be neutral on the beliefs, faith, and philosophical 
orientation of society” (Yavuz 2000:36). 
3.2.1. The military interruption and the period of the post-Welfare Party 
 After one-party rule of the People’s Republican Party (PRP), Turkish society was 
faced with multi-party system in 1946. With this new system, the public Islam got a first 
time chance to transform and mobilize itself into politics with the Democrat Party (DP). 
Despite the changes of the “minimum conditions” to the “optimum conditions” with the DP, 
public Islam’s political tendencies continued until becoming a movement of protest.  
In 1995, for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, a party with an 
explicitly Islamist platform received a plurality of votes in a legislative election. The 
Welfare Party (WP), by its Turkish initial as Refah, a successor of the two successive 
Islamist political parties (National Order Party [NOP:1970-1971] and National Salvation 
Party [NSP: 1972-1981]), received over 21.3 percent of the votes and got 158 seats (nearly 
30 percent of the total) in the December 1995 elections while the other two right-center 
parties, the True Path Party (TPP) and the Motherland Party (MP), each received nearly 20 
percent of the votes. Bulent Ecevit’s Democratic Left (DLP) and Deniz Baykal’s PRP 
together were able to get 25 percent.5  
Even though the WP gained more votes than any other single party, it was not invited 
                                                                 
5 Final preliminary results of Turkey general poll, Reuters (on-line), December 25, 1995. 
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by President Suleyman Demirle to form the government at first. However, soon after the 
breakdown of the Motherland-True Path coalition government, the WP formed a coalition 
government with the TPP under Erbakan’s Prime Minister in June 1996 “despite the 
Kemalist circles’s the harsh criticisms based on the previous violent conflict in Algeria” 
(Erdogan 1999:10) between the state and the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front). Subsequently,  
the Kemalist circle including the leftist and secular PRP, which has always played a 
provocative role in creating conflict in order to come to power throughout the Republican 
history, started a lobby and campaign against the Islamist party (Yenisafak, April 25, 2003). 
In this development, particularly, the results of either anti-secular rhetoric and activities of 
the party mayors and deputies or the practices in international politics such as visiting the 
Libyan leader Qaddafi and the attempts to develop a close relationship with Iran agitated the 
secular Kemalist circle (Narli 1999). As a result of this provocative campaign, the 
democratic rule of the pro-Islamic WP coalition government with Tansu Ciller’s TPP was 
interrupted by the military in the summer of 1997. Consequently, Necmettin Erbakan and 
seven other deputies were banned from political activities for five years and the WP was 
officially shut down in January 1998 by the Constitutional Court (CC) because it allegedly 
violated a law prohibiting any attempt “to change the secular character of the Turkish 
Republic,” according to the National Security Council (NSC)6 and the CC (Peterson 1998:2). 
Therefore, the interruption that was made directly to political Islam would introduce a new 
terminology called “postmodern coup” or “soft coup” to Turkish politics, albeit not directly 
a coup d'état. It is also called the “28 February Process” (Candar 2000; Yavuz 2000).  
                                                                 
6 A military-controlled policy making body that shadows the civilian Cabinet and its secretary –four star general –is often referred to as a 
parallel prime minister, his power equal and sometimes exceed those of civilian ministers.  
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Hasan Celal Guzel, former minister of culture and education during Turgut Ozal’s 
term, and the former leader of the Rebirth Party, was imprisoned in late December 1999 
because of his speech where he had criticized the military’s intervention in politics, which 
had led the WP to resign in June 1997 (Ahmed 2001:1). Recep Tayyip Erdogan was jailed 
for four months of a 10-month term in 1998 for reciting a poem from the nationalist thinker 
Ziya Gokalp who inspired the Ataturk. Moreover, some universities, schools, and state 
offices attempted to strictly enforce the ban against the headscarf –a traditional Islamic dress 
to cover hair— and consequently barred all women who chose to wear the headscarf from 
essential public activity (Candar 2000). Later, the Virtue Party (VP) established in December 
7, 1997, as a successor to the Welfare Party, was outlawed in 2000 by the CC because of the 
reincarnation of the WP and carrying out anti-secular characteristics even though the VP 
took some new approaches to change its image in a number of ways. Hence, some deputies 
of the party as well as the Welfare Party were forbidden from founding a new party and from 
involvement in any political activities. 
At the same time, the reasons of the WP’s ban caused a power struggle within the 
short- lived new party (VP) between the traditionalist wing who were loyal to Erbakan and 
the reformist wing led by Abdullah Gul and Tayyip Erdogan who was the popular former 
Istanbul Mayor of the WP. Soon after the closure of the VP, this struggle resulted in two new 
different parties: the conservative Felicity (Saadet) Party (FP) of Recai Kutan loyal to 
Erbakan and the reformist and moderate Justice and Development Party (JDP or AK Party) 
of Erdogan. However, at the beginning, Erdogan was banned by the CC from taking the role 
of the founding president of the AK Party established in August 14, 2001 and later his 
application to the general election on November 3, 2002 in order to join as a deputy 
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candidate was refused by the Higher Electoral Board (YSK) because of a jail sentence he 
served in 1998-1999 for publicly reading a poem that the CC said was anti-secular.  
The primary reason for all restrictions imposed by the secular military-dominated 
establishment circle was that “the popularity of Islam constitutes a threat to the legitimacy of 
Kemalism as the state ideology” (Ahmed 2001:10). All Kema list columnists’ expectations, 
for example, during the escalation of internal tensions between the military and Prime 
Minister Erbakan’s party, were that the followers of the party would be inclined toward 
radicalism and violence against the governing Kemalists. Although the Kemalist journalists 
were writing that Turkey would turn into a Jazaira (Arabic name for Algeria), contrary to 
most expectations and despite the state’s continuous human rights violations, neither the 
followers of the Islamic minded WP and VP nor women students who were banned from 
their education and work rights yielded to radical and violent Islam. Although four major 
Islamic-minded parties, (NOP in 1971, NSP in 1981, WP in 1998, and VP in 2000) have 
been banned during the past 30 years, they “have never resorted to subversive activities or 
violence, but they have simply established new parties” (Candar 2000). As Landau (1997) 
has observed, the Turkish case is somewhat unique and the Islamists have resorted to 
achieving power via partic ipation in competitive elections, shunning violence. 
Where Turkey stands today is somewhat different from past years even though the 
headscarf restriction continues for women in schools and work places. The AK Party (JDP) 
under Erdogan’s leadership has won a crushing victory in the general election on November 
3, 2002 with 34.2 percent of the vote or 364 of the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s 550 
seats. The AK Party’s sweeping victory was a “social explosion” at the ballot box that 
represents protests for results of the “post modern coup” dubbed in 1997 and political and 
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economic corruption (Peuch 2003:1). The AK Party government is trying to keep its 
promise to solve the civil and human rights problem, to take Turkey out of a two-year 
economic depression, to end corruption in state structures, and to advocate for Turkeys’ EU 
membership. The most important development in the Turkish democratization process is that 
the AK Party made its banned leader Tayyip Erdogan prime minister on March 9, 2003 after 
a three-month successful Abdullah Gul administration. 
Turkey is now waiting for the year 2004 to begin negotiations to enter the European 
Union (EU). The AK Party government and the parliaments “took seven steps in the 
country’s quest to join the EU by giving overwhelming approval to a landmark package of 
reforms designed to significantly curtail the political power of the military.” Although the 
legislative reform packages aimed at gaining entry to the EU, the most significant measure in 
the package was to limit military power (Wilkinson 2003). Off special importance is that the 
last “reform package strips the National Security Council of executive authority and reduces 
it to an advisory body. It also opens up the military budget to greater parliamentary scrutiny” 
(Wilkinson 2003). In fact, the packages abolished many old “laws curtailing freedom of 
thought, expression and assembly” (Wilkinson 2003). Turkey is today more democratic than 
in the past.  
3.3. The foundation of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria  
 By the early 16th century the Ottoman rule had begun over the Central Maghreb7 and 
has continued for more than 270 years. In this period, Stone affirms, “the Turks ruled a 
relatively stable and economically successful state in the Central Maghreb until 1830” 
(1997:28). After the decline of the Ottoman rule in the Central Maghreb, particularly in 
                                                                 
7 Central Maghreb refers to the Middle East, North and Central Africa during this period of time in Ottoman literature. 
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Algeria, the French occupation began with the seizure of Algiers in 1830 and ended with 
the Evian Accords on March 18, 1962, which led to full political independence in July 1962.  
According to Stone, the “French conquest of Algeria was one of the most ignominious 
examples of systematic colonization that the world has ever seen” (1997:31). Within the first 
ten years the colonial authorities had settled more than 200,000 Europeans in and around the 
occupied cities.  By 1892 the Algerian population consisted of 300,000 French citizens, 
200,000 non-French Europeans, and at least 4 million Muslim who had been rendered 
second-class and dispossessed inhabitants (Stone 1997:33).  
French colonization, therefore, created a limited French-speaking and Western-
educated Muslim elite in Algeria. The founders of the new independent state would come 
from among those elites. The beginning of nationalist aspirations in Algeria was the First 
World War (Stone 1997:33). During the rise of the Arab nationalist movement in Algeria 
there were three known camps in which parallel to the nationalism, westernism, and 
Islamism in the late of the Ottoman Empire. One group that supported the integration of 
Algeria into France was led by Ferhat Abbas. Ferhat Abbas later shifted his position away 
from integration into France towards a loose association of Europeans and Muslims in 
Algeria based on full equality for both communities, and he established Democratic Union 
Algerian Manifest (DUAM) which advocated the establishment of a secular autonomous 
state linked to France. The second camp was those who advocated full independence led by 
Messali al-Hadj. He formed a more radical organization demanding a fully independent 
sovereign Algerian State, the Mouvement pour Le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques 
(MTLD) which later became the Algerian National Movement (ANM) as a successor of the 
MTLD. The final camp was led by Ben Badis who represented the conservative Association 
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of Reformist Ulema (ARU). He was championing religious elements and full independence 
(Stone 1997:34-36).   
In March 1954, five MTLD members established Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et 
d’Action (CRUA). Another group joined this organization between March and October 1954 
which changed its name (November 1, 1954) into National Liberation Front (FLN), the 
political wing of the National Liberation Army (ALN). In August 1956, Stone noted, “the 
FLN held a secret congress at Soummam in Kabylia … and adopted an explicitly socialist 
political program” (1997:37-38).  The mainstay of the FLN movement was Arab nationalist 
and socialist President Jamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt (Stone 1997:38). After the Evian 
Accords on March 18, 1962, which trigge red full independence from France in July, 
“Algeria was designated a socialist one-party state with the FLN as the sole permitted 
political body.” Even though “Islam was defined as the religion of the state,” the socialist 
one-party state has been attempting to implement a secular policy (Stone 1997:45). Viorst 
states that the FLN State “had never thought of itself as particularly Islamic. The Algerian 
government was not just secular, but it was also despotic, corrupt, and rigidly socialist” 
(1997:89). 
There is no doubt that the major secularization of institutions in Algeria occurred 
during the period of French colonization, with merely the expansion of those institutions 
after independence. The France-educated Algerian elites were totally influenced by French 
secular ideas.  In the post-colonial period, each new government sought to incorporate native 
identity (Islamic culture) into their legitimacy, even as they were simultaneously building a 
largely secular state.  
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Similar to the Turkish Kemalist regime, the Algerian socialist secular regime failed 
to create a cohesive state and social contract that would recognize the diversity of its society 
because of the absence of democracy in the country. Therefore, a number of reactionary 
groups emerged to take action against the repression and failure of the state. By late 1988 
president Chadli Bendjedid endeavored to bring about the beginning of the end of the 
socialist state. He attempted to end the Algerian single-party (FLN) state replacing it with a 
commitment to multi-party democracy. In 1989, with the new constitution taking effect, “the 
government justified its decision to legalize the Islamic Salvation Front, commonly known 
by its French initials as FIS, by interpreting the clause as allowing organizations inspired by 
Islamic values” (Stone 1997:69). However, President “Chadli’s liberalization policies, 
similar to those of Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union, were too little and too late to 
prevent the outburst of deep social and economic discontent which found its most violent 
expression in the deadly nationwide riots of October 1988” (Entelis 2000:xii). 
3.3.1. The Islamic Salvation Front and the military junta 
The results of the first multi-party elections in Algeria were “of enormous 
significance to Algeria as well as elsewhere in the Islamic world” (Stone 1997:72). 
However, the victory of FIS in the local elections in 1990 frightened the ruling elite and 
army forces. After the first-round of the 1991 parliamentary elections, the army staged a 
coup in January 16, 1992 to prevent a second round of parliamentary elections that would 
have given the FIS a two-thirds majority in the legislature. The military junta cracked down 
on the FIS and cancelled the electoral process.   
After the cancellation of the election and the closure of the FIS by the army as the 
protector of national independence and revolution (Stone 1997), the radical groups 
 26 
undeniably resorted to violent action against the state forces. However, the situation of 
violence and counter-violence was not only the result of stopping the electoral process in 
1992, it was rather the consequence of more than thirty years of a socialist totalitarian 
regime’s secular policies harshly imposed on the country. In view of their situation the 
Algerian crises can be seen as the consequence of total absence of democracy. 
The cancellation of the election and the closure of the FIS by the state force was the 
opportunity for the radical groups to mobilize. The involvement of radicals in conflict with 
the ruling elites in Algeria, in fact, goes back to the intensive secularization and socialization 
policies of the governments in the 1970s. While moderate Islamist groups have been more 
active in the country’s politics since the late 1980s, the conflict exclusively rose from the 
early 1990s onwards. In terms of a historical overview, the conflict was often generated by 
the state in its attempts to quell the emergence of the mainstream opposition movement’s 
protest against state corruption, anti-democratic practices and political authoritarianism.  
The successes of FIS within the democratic process were viewed by the army and 
ruling class as an even more dangerous threat than armed revolution in Iran. The military’s 
junta in 1992 and suppression radicalized the originally nonviolent FIS members whose 
moderate leaders (Abbassi Madani, Ali Benhadj, Mahfoudh Nahnah, Mohamed Said, 
Hachemi Sahnuni, Ahmed Shanoun and Abdelkader Hachani) had been imprisoned or exiled 
or kept under surveillance, and caused the emergence of the first armed insurgency, the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) who “set in motion a cycle of counterviolence” (Esposito 
2002:103; Entelis 1997:43). Consequently, the radical armed groups have been involved in 
violent acts directed at the overthrow of the state, in particular its old-age system and the 
establishment of an Islamic system.  
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Souaidia (2001) observed that the military junta has caused political violence and 
civil war in Algeria to a point that no other Arab country has experienced in the 1990s. As 
many as 150,000 people have died since 1992, tens of thousands have been injured, and 
more than 20,000 are missing. Since January 2000, there has been an estimated 200 deaths 
per week. A former Algerian army officer Habib Souaidia shocked French public opinion in 
early 2001 with his book8 describing torture, executions, and other atrocities against civilians 
committed by Algerian military units and intelligence services in their fight against Islamist 
insurgents.  
3.3. Conceptual framework 
 There are three major ways to respond to conflict between the governing elites and 
Islamists in Turkey and Algeria: violence, coercion, force (imposing one’s position on others 
against their will); nonviolent act (finding third positions which incorporate the concerns and 
needs of both parties, positions on which both parties can agree), avoidance (pretending it 
does not exist, not wanting to stir up more trouble). 
 In this context, the conceptual framework deals with theories of interpretation, 
conflict, and nonviolent conflict resolution. The deliberate choice of these theories is aimed 
at fulfilling the intent of the research since the study is influenced by these perspectives. The 
applicability of these theories to the case of Algeria and Turkey will best be articulated when 
examining the theories themselves.  
 The first theory under consideration is the interpretation theory. Interpretation is a 
tafsir and ta’wil (explication, exegesis, clarification, commentary, and analysis) of the 
written and recorded Islamic materials. Hermeneuticism sees interpretation as a circular 
                                                                 
8 Souaidia, Habib.2001. La Sale Guerre (The Dirty War). Paris: La Découverte 
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process whereby valid interpretation can be achieved by a sustained, mutually qualifying 
interplay between our progressive sense of the whole and our retrospective understanding of 
its component parts.  
The main reason for the conflict between secularization and Islamization lies with the 
hermeneutics of Islam. Presumably different interpretations of Islam, specifically of the 
Qur’an, may lead to different understandings and different perspectives, which in turn might 
create deviant societies.   
This thesis also uses social conflict theory. According to principles of conflict theory, 
the undemocratic regimes are responsible for destroying social, political and economic 
systems. These kinds of regimes not only produce problems and deepen crises, but also feed 
radicalism, violence, and terrorism. Radicalism or terrorism in order to attain its own goal 
tries to stir up disputes and tensions between nations, and members of different religions and 
cultures, and thus ignite conflicts.  
Conflict theorists see a conflict as a division (secular or religious), struggle or battle, 
perhaps a violent confrontation between opposing parties.  In conflict two or more parties 
may be involved, and their conflict represents a crystallization of the competition (Kriesberg 
1982). People and groups differ about a wide variety of values and beliefs. Disagreements 
about what is desirable, a secular or nonsecular state, are particularly relevant to conflicts 
that are expressed in violence. People, in other words, may differ about the criteria or 
standards by which they judge or evaluate one another. If one group desires to dominate 
another, the conflict is likely to occur between parties. The dominator may be a specific 
group or it may be society, which develops and maintains norms that favor one group over 
another. Conflict that escalates to violence inflicts harm on individuals and the whole fabric 
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of society including physical injury and death, damage to property and the cultivation of 
hatred and fear (Coser 1968; Williams 1977; Himes 1980; Kriesberg 1982).  
According to the “deprivation” approach based on the conflict theory, there is 
sufficient agreement in consensual struggles that the more deprived people are, the worse 
they feel. The more deprived people are, the more likely they are to nourish general feelings 
of frustration. People who are greatly deprived and pressured or whose life conditions have 
deteriorated are more likely to support radical goals and acts (Blau 1964; Dahrendorf 1954).  
Also, if people’s efforts to implement their rights are blocked, they become exasperated and 
aggressive. An assumption about the origin of frustration and aggression also based on 
conflict theory was developed by German psychologist Freud’s followers. According to the 
disciples of Freud, whenever a person’s effort to reach any goal is blocked, an aggressive 
drive is induced that motivates behavior for having assault the obstacle (person or object) 
causing the frustration. When these assumptions are applied to the aforementioned case of 
Algeria, it can be seen how Algerian Islamic groups went “naturally” into the violent option.  
But, not all conflicts are bad. Sometimes conflict can be opportunity for a social 
change. The function of social conflict is to accelerate the reconciliation of people’s 
justifiable concerns. Therefore, conflict can serve as a safe valve when the disagreements 
and aggressions between members are honestly articulated and worked through. Vago 
(1989) notes that conflict theorists consider change, rather than order, as the essential 
element of social life. The ideology (secularism/Kemalism or Islamism) or struggle is 
viewed as a significant leverage of social change or largely a result of other changes. While 
Marxists have long argued that conflict between classes is the primary cause of change in 
society, most contemporary sociologists believe that struggle between other kinds of groups 
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(governing regime or ruling elite and Islamic groups) can also lead to substantial societal 
change. (Friedenfels 1988). Nevertheless, change can always be positive or negative. 
The final theory in this section is that of nonviolent conflict resolution popularized by 
Mohandas Gandhi. According to Gandhi, conflict is “an opportunity for growth in the 
relationship” and “a chance to create a new relationship which would permit everyone 
concerned to reach their goals” (DeMott 1987:12). For him, conflict is, DeMott writes, “not 
a matter of one side winning and the other side losing, but rather a creative process” which 
leads both sides to win. The “creative process” in Gandhi’s view is described in two ways as 
an “artistic creative process” or a “dialectical process” (1987:12).  
Other conflict resolution approaches are based on the theory and methods of 
Gandhian nonviolence. Many people are credited with introducing Gandhi’s techniques of 
nonviolent protest to their specific civil right movements such as Martin Luther King, 
Desmond Tutu, and Fethullah Gulen. 
Gene Sharp, in his work entitled, The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle that 
might guide us in examining the actions of Islamic groups in Turkey makes a notable 
contribution to the theoretical understanding of nonviolent movements. Martin Luther 
King’s and other’s nonviolent struggles in America as well as Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s 
in South Africa helped their countries move forward in terms of change to more democratic 
principles. These practical examples will serve as a model in determining my research 
questions as well.  
3.4. Research questions and hypothesis 
 Assuming that there is a positive relationship between the pressure and tendency to 
radicalism and violence does not always work in every sphere because other factor(s) may 
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play key role(s) to cool down those who are deprived from their human and civil rights 
and the feelings of frustration and deprivation.  
 Algeria’s civil war during the last decade is a case in point. But, contrary to that 
cause and effect pattern, the outcome of undemocratic policies in Turkey did not lead the 
Islamic groups to radical and violent reactions. Although four major Turkish Islamist parties 
(National Order, National Salvation, Welfare, and Virtue) have been banned during the past 
30 years, the activists have never resorted to subversive activities or violence, but have 
simply reestablished new parties.  
3.4.1. Research questions 
 Based on the conflict, nonviolent and interpretation theories, the following questions 
will be investigated in the study by comparing Turkish and Algerian Islamic movements: 
· What key factors favored/discouraged the use of violence by Islamic groups in 
the two countries?  
· What is the impact of sociopolitical and cultural heritage in the responses to 
secular repression in Algeria and Turkey?  
· What is the answer of Islam to the repression, violence and terrorism?  
3.4.2. Hypothesis 
 The explanation of why the reactions of the Islamic groups to the repression and 
secular state policies was not the same in two countries is related to the different 
interpretations of Islam. Because of the different interpretations of Islam in Turkey and 
Algeria, the reactions of Muslims to the policies of their states have resulted in non-violence 
in Turkey and violence in Algeria. 
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 Therefore, the response to secular policies (dependent variable) is supposedly the 
function of the difference in interpretations (independent variable).  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1. Methodology 
 This study is designed as an exploratory case study research. Much of the research 
was conducted in English; however, my knowledge of Turkish and Qur’anic Arabic, 
together with my familiarity with the cultures of both countries greatly helped in the 
interpretation of expressions not translated, as well as in understanding the global contexts of 
evolution of these states and societies.  
 The data needed for this study were gathered from primary and secondary sources. 
Data were drawn from English and Turkish daily newspapers such as Zaman and Yenisafak, 
books, and academic journals. Also, recent publications and reports on print or on the 
Internet were selectively searched. During my certificate program at Hartford Seminary in 
Hartford, Connecticut, I had the opportunity to conduct research at the Seminary Library and 
the library of the Center for Religion Research. Much of my research was conducted in the 
Gumberg Library of Duquesne University and the Hilman Library at University of 
Pittsburgh. Also, I had limited access to the Temple University library.  However, especially, 
the Hartford Seminary Libraries provided me with access to the most important and current 
writings on Islam, political Islam, and the Near and Middle Eastern and North Africa 
regions.   
 The methodology used in this research is a two-way comparison of the major 
historical periods in each country and between the two countries. Therefore, the research 
analysis focuses on the differences between the responses of the Islamic groups to secular 
repression in the two countries. In order to conduct this analysis I first researched the 
background information of the pertinent reactions in the key historical periods in each 
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country, and then analyzed the rise of the political Islam in Turkey in the 1970s and in 
Algeria in the 1980s. I examined the periods from the first general election in 1989 to the 
Rome Agreement in 1998 between the government and the opposition groups in Algeria, and 
from the establishment of the Islamist Erbakan administration in 1996 to the Justice and 
Development Party government in February 2003 after the general election in November 3, 
2002 in Turkey. However, I explicitly focused on the dates of the military junta in 1992 in 
Algeria and the “post modern” coup in 1997 in Turkey. 
 The main method I pursued was to analyze the differences in charters of Islamic 
movements and groups in the two countries in terms of their referral to how they interpret 
and understand the Islamic texts. I searched and analyzed the English and Turkish 
newspapers, books, and journal articles as well as the written Arabic religious texts and 
articles about jihad, radicalism, violence, political Islam, the administration system in Islam, 
and democracy. I checked the online archives in the web sites of the Turkish newspapers, 
Zaman, Yenisafak, Milli Gazette, Milliyet, Sabah between 1996 and 2003.  I also used the 
results of the surveys conducted by the TUSES (Social Economic Research Foundation of 
Turkey) in 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2002 and TUSEV (Social and Economic Study 
Foundation of Turkey) in 1999.  Moreover, I analyzed the interviews conducted by the 
Mohammed Himeur for the BBC News and Out There News (OTN) in 1998, by Daniel 
Pipes on June 1998, and by Terence McKenna for the CBC-CA television on June 9-16, 
2002.  
 I, furthermore, looked at the ayahs in the Qur’an and Hadiths particularly the section 
of Jihad in the Qutub-u Sitte (Six Books) referring to extremism, radicalism, violence, war, 
jihad, moderate, tolerance, and political administration.  
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4.2. Limitations 
 While doing this research, it should always be borne in mind that we may often go 
beyond the obvious or manifest content in search of the latent meaning of what has been said 
or written. My main task here was to make sure that my values, motives, and personal 
background influence the conduct of this analysis as little as possible albeit it was never 
feasible to get rid of them completely.  
 Even though I had anticipated no serious difficulties regarding access to data sources 
in order to explore the hypotheses of my research questions would arise, I faced many 
difficulties. The usual rarity of supporting materials in English was the most obvious 
limitation in my work.  The most writings done by the Islamist groups were in French 
language in Algeria while in Turkish in Turkey. I translated and sometimes interpreted the 
information I surveyed in Turkish and Arabic to English. But, my lack of skill in translating 
French was the biggest obstacle in analyzing the primary and secondary sources available 
solely in French.  
 In addition, radical movements in the world, specifically in the Islamic realm are a 
result of numerous factors existing interdependently. Therefore, there might be some 
extraneous factor(s) apart from those examined here that might play a role in explaining the 
relationship between pressure by the ruling class and peoples' reactions to it.  
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 In the light of available evidence, this research deals with the reinterpretation of 
traditional Islamic concepts such as jahiliyyah, takfir (apostate), and jihad that are the key 
terms in the explanation of the different responses given by the Islamic groups and 
movements in Algeria and Turkey. The findings show that the internal political conflict in 
both countries, whether led as violence or nonviolence resistance, was the outcome of 
different re-interpretations and understandings of these concepts.  
 The Islamic political and social movements and organizations can be divided into 
two broad types in both countries: modernist and radical tendencies. The radical tendency 
represents a revolutionary behavior and attitudes while the modernist approach advocates 
evolutionary change and is tolerant. The division between the modernist and radical 
grouping is determined by the extent to which the characterization of society as jahiliyyah is 
applied. Does this characterization just cover the regime? Or does it include the bureaucracy 
and military as a ruling class? Or does it extend to society as a whole? The answers to these 
questions are the basis for the division between modernist and radical Islamic groups.  
In the reinterpretation of these concepts and given decisions on the behavior and 
attitude of the rulers and elites as to whether they are “Islamic” or “un-Islamic”, the 
sociopolitical cultural background of each country also has a considerable role. Before 
explaining the impact of the sociopolitical cultural heritage in the reinterpretation of these 
concepts and in the responses to secular repression in Algeria and Turkey, I would like to 
examine the key factors that favored or discouraged the use of violence in each country. 
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5.1. The key factors that favored and discouraged the use of violence 
Under the following headings I am going to explain why Algeria is in favor of 
violent struggle while Turkey is for nonviolence.  
5.1.1. ALGERIA: at the crossroad 
Since religion in and of itself does not lead to intolerance, what are the key factors 
that nourished the deviant interpretation which favored the use of violence in Algeria? The 
findings showed that in the mobilization of the struggle and organization of the people 
against the ruling elite, the deviant interpretation of the religious texts about the jahiliyyah 
and jihad concepts that were shaped by the political schisms especially in the Middle East 
and North Africa played a significant role in Algerian conflict (Phillips 1995; Zeidan 2001; 
Wiktorowicz 2001; Esposito 2002; Kepel 2002). As Kirkpatrick (1993) claimed, 
unquestioned religious faith and too strict literal interpretation of the religious source and 
practice generally support the fundamentalism and discriminatory attitudes. Now I would 
like to explain the influential factors that favored the conflict in Algeria. 
5.1.1.1. Sayyid Qutb and Jahiliyyah Analogy 
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) was “the ideologue of the reformist Muslim Brotherhood 
in the 1950s and 1960s who was tortured and executed by President Nasser for his book 
Milestone (Ma’alim fil Tariq) which reinterpreted traditional Islamic concepts to justify a 
violent takeover of the state” (Zeidan 2001:3). Because “his reinterpretation of traditional 
Islamic concepts was the catalyst for the rise of the radical” (Zeidan 2001:3; Esposito 
2002:8) Arab youth in the Middle East and North Africa since late 1960s, he is the godfather 
of modern revolutionary struggle (jihad) according to some political Islam scholars in the 
West such as Oliver Roy, Gilles Kepel, and John Esposito. The socialist, secular and 
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despotic policies of the President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt were the catalyst for the 
development of his worldviews into a “revolutionary” ideology. In the evolution and 
development of Qutb’s revolutionary doctrine, the ideas of Islamism of Abdul A’la 
Mawdudi (1903-1979) and the concepts of jahiliyyah and jihad of Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-
1328) who legitimized the revolutionary struggle (jihad) against the Mongol rulers, who 
occupied the Abbasid State in 1258, play an important role (Esposito 2002:45). Ibn 
Taymiyyah who was influenced by the Hanbaliyyah school (generally advocates the literal 
interpretation of Islamic sources) issued a fatwa declaring the Mongols authorities have 
jahili behavior and attitudes. Because of their persistence to “follow the Yasa code of laws 
of Genghis Khan instead of the Islamic law, Shari’ah, for Ibn Taymiyyah they were no better 
than the polytheists of the pre-Islamic jahiliyyah” (Esposito 2002:46). 
 Like Ibn Taymiyyah, Sayyid Qutb reinterpreted the term Jahiliyyah in which 
traditional Islam literally “denotes the historic condition of immoral paganism and crude 
ignorance in the pre-Islamic Arabia” (Zeidan 2001:15) to “mean any contemporary system 
not based on the original holy sources of Qur’an and Hadith and not operating under 
Shari’a,” Islamic law (Zeidan 2001:3). The goal of religion is to bring about a movement 
from darkness to light, inspired goals in religion’s “pristine purity” (Duran 2001:69). The 
Prophet Muhammad used the term jahiliyyah for the barbarism in Mecca before Islam. The 
mercantile aristocracy used to rule Mecca and profit “from an ancient temple that drew 
worshipers from all over Arabia.” Islam “was a revolt against idolatry as well as against the 
hypocrisy, materialism, and injustice that characterized this cynical ruling class” (Duran 
2001:68). So, Qutb’s worldviews can be characterized by two camps: God’s party versus 
Satan’s. For Qutb, every believer must struggle (jihad) between God’s forces of good and 
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Satan’s forces of evil, between light and darkness or ignorance (jahiliyyah) (Qutb 
1990:101-102, 111-113). 
 In this sense, Qutb also “started the contemporary Islamic debate on separation by his 
re-interpretation of separation (mufassala) and migration (hijra)” with reference to the 
Prophet Muhammad’s migration from Mecca to Medina (Zeidan 2001:6). Separation from 
worldly and jahili society and “its corrupting influences, evidenced by norms of conduct, 
dress and behavior” is “a necessary step for establishing boundaries and identity” (Zeidan 
2001:6). “In the Islamic golden age, when a person became a Muslim he made a clean break 
with his past, separating himself totally from the jahili environment, and starting a new life 
with the Qur’an as his only guide” (Zeidan 2001:7). So, for Qutb, the distinguishing feature 
of the first generation is a necessary condition for any modern renewal. He said that “in the 
early stages of the new Islamic movement, we must remove ourselves from all influences of 
the jahiliyyah in which we live and from which we derive our benefits.” (1990:14-16). 
However, this separation does not mean total physical separation; rather it is conceived of as 
a spiritual and moral separation (Zeidan 2001:7).  
 In Qutb’s perspective, all Muslim and Western socie ties including Christian, Jewish, 
and Communist are accused of being in a state of jahiliyyah and viewed as not truly Islamic 
regimes and the state exists today (1990:5-11, 5-51, 65-67). He “reinterpreted jihad to mean 
the permanent conflict between the Islamic system and all contemporary jahili paradigms. 
The concepts of the two systems are totally incompatible, so there is no possibility of 
compromise or coexistence between them. Islam means total submission to God and his law, 
while jahili systems are ‘a deviation from the worship of One God and the divinely ordained 
way of life’” (Zeidan 2001:3).  For him, as for Ibn Taymiyyah, jihad includes the overthrow 
 40 
of jahili regimes and governments that failed to enforce the Islamic law in order to replace 
them by the Islamic one (Streusand 1997:3; Zeidan 2001:16-17). Therefore, the accusation 
of societies and regimes as well as individuals “as apostate (takfir) made them into 
legitimate targets for active jihad. Qutb’s reinterpretation of jahiliyyah and takfir unsheathed 
a tempting weapon for radicals: the possibility of pronouncing all rival groups and 
individuals as kuffar –thus paving the way for indiscriminate terror as practiced by the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria” (Zeidan 2001:16). 
5.1.1.2. Wahhabism 
 The emergence of Wahhabism broadly based on the forms of jurisprudential and 
theological orthodoxy during the early Islamic history has not been prevented. In the middle 
of the 18th century, a group known as Wahhabiyyah, religiously and politically challenging 
to the Ottoman state authorities, emerged with the purpose of “purifying” Islam from non-
Islamic accretions and returning the society to the pure and authentic Islam of the Prophet. 
 The movement that later gave birth to the Saudi Arabia monarchy in the future has 
taken its name from the founder, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791) who “was the 
first to reintroduce the Khariji9 concept of takfir into their doctrinal worldview” (Zeidan 
2001:15; Duran 2001:279). Even though al-Wahhab received his inspiration from the 
combined ideas and actions of Ibn Taymiyyah as his exemplar, “he was also the first to 
expand the concept of jahiliyyah to include Muslim societies of his time”.  And he “used 
takfir both against non-Muslims and against Muslims he defined as hypocrites or infidels” 
(Zeidan 2001:15). Like Hanbaliyyah madhab, one of the four Sunni jurisprudential and 
                                                                 
9 Kharijis rebelled against and seceded from the fourth Khalifah Ali’s camp in 659 AD and instigated many rebellions in the first century of 
Islam until cruelly suppressed, because of his compromise with Mu’awiya in the internal political conflict. They judged all Muslims as in 
state of jahiliyyah and a kuffar (unbeliever) who must be countered by jihad. 
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theological schools, Wahhabi faith advocates the literal interpretation of the Qur’an and 
Hadiths for the Islamic law and rejects other sources such as the Qiyas (analogy), Ijma’a 
(consesus), and ijtihad (judicial opinion). The Wahhabis reject completely anything they 
view as a bid’a (innovation) or a jahili (an un-Islamic attitudes and behaviors) constituted as 
a kufr (unbelief) that is seen as deviating from fundamental teachings of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah (Esposito 2002:6,48; Zeidan 2001:15). The Wahhabi approach was also called 
Salafiyyah or Salafi movement that “has clashed with a number of other Islamic sects” in 
particular Sufis, “which are often decried as un-Islamic” (Wiktorowicz 2001:20-21). 
According to Bruce Lawrence, “while it does not, in and of itself, promote violence, there 
are elements and possibilities in Wahhabism for extremism” (quoted in Harden 2001:2).  
 Wahhabi ideology has been internationally exported with the help of “both 
government-sponsored organizations and wealthy individuals … to other countries and 
communities in the Muslim world and the West” (Esposito 2001:49; Ziedan 2001:15-16). 
The Wahhabis of Arabia “believe tha t their faith should be spread around the world and that 
they have a special obligation to defend Islam, with violence if need be, in countries where it 
is already well established” (Harden 2001:2). “Since the 1950s, when Saudi Arabia 
supported Islamists against the Arab nationalist regime of Egyptian President Jamal Abdel 
Nasser and granted asylum to many of them, there has been a process of cross-fertilization 
and integration between Wahhabism and contemporary fundamentalism. Radical Saudi 
figures such as Muahmmad al-Mas’ri and Usama bin Laden carry this integrated Wahhabi-
fundamentalist legacy” (Zeidan 2001:-15-16). For example, “Qamar al-Din Kharba, leader 
of the Algerian Afghans, received support from (Wahhabi) Usama bin Laden for logistical 
and financial support” (Wictorowicz 2001:28). Accordingly, this Wahhabi (Salafi) vision 
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that represents a politically and religiously radical fringe has played a considerable role in 
the development of the armed radical groups during the civil war in Algeria (Wictorowicz 
2001:22-33, Zeidan 2001:15-16; Esposito 2002:49-50).  
5.1.1.3. Shi’ism and Iran Revolution  
 An intensive political incapacitation in Iran resulted in an economic and financial 
crisis in the 1958s. This development threw Iran to American’s embrace for basic economic 
and political aid. This development was the first step in the evolution of the Islamic 
revolutionary ideology against the secular Shah Reza Khan’s military dictatorship in Iran. 
The reform packages under the title “Alliance for Progress” that American authorities 
advised for the Shah administration in order to take the country out of the economic and 
political crisis made Iranian radicals “anti-American”. The conservative Shi’i religious cleric 
Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989) like other Shia ulama was influenced by the radical social 
and political thinker and scholar Ali Shariati (1933-1977) who was the main ideologue of the 
Iranian revolution. Shariati re- interpreted the similar concepts in the conservative Sunni 
understanding such as jahiliyyah, takfir, jihad and mufassala (separation), and expressed 
them in the Shia terminology. Shariati became the inspiration for the “grand Islamic idea” of 
Ayatollah Khomeini who would revolt in order to overthrow the secular dictator Shah Reza 
Pahlavi in 1979. Khomeini used Shariati’s reinterpretations on the concepts in the 
eschatological symbols and the mythological memory of Hussein’s martyrdom10 (istishad) 
within the logic of Jahiliyyah analogies in order to mobilize the support for revolutionary 
movements (Kepel 1997; Zeidan 2001:9; Esposito 2002). 
                                                                 
10 Shia martyrdom has a long pedigree beginning with that of Ali and Hussein, which are annually commemorated in the Ashura . 
Martyrdom as a political and military tool has been especially cultivated by Fedayin-i Islam in Iran, Hezbullah in Lebanon, and other Shia 
groups in other arenas against perceived enemies as in Afghanistan, Algeria, etc. 
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 The success of the Islamic revolution of Khomeini in Iran became an example of 
the contemporary radical movements. Even though the Iranian revolution belongs to Shia 
Islam which uses the allegorical interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet in 
the Khariji line, it played an important role in the mobilization of the GIA and other extreme 
groups in Algeria (Imposimato 2001:3). Among the fundamentalists, Algerian Afghans who 
fought with Shi’i groups in Afghanistan against the communist Soviet Union have a 
philosophic association with Shiism and the Khomeinist Iran which is anti-Communist, anti-
American, and anti-Semitic (Kepel 1997; Imposimato 2001; Esposiot 2002). As a result of 
this association, “the Khariji and Isma’ili traditions of suicide-killings” among the 
fundamentalist Shi’is “as a legitimate weapon in their contemporary jihad” motivating the 
radical armed groups in Algeria “to encourage and organize acts of violent martyrdom” (Roy 
1994:65-67; Zeidan 2001:20).  
Accordingly, the Algerian veterans who were drunk with happiness of the victory 
against the communists in Afghanistan and other radical groups under the umbrella of the 
GIA, assumed that they could overthrow the secular and socialist regime in Algeria by force 
hoping to follow the Iranian example. 
5.1.1.4. The Arab-Afghan Mujahidins and the armed groups  
 Since the independence of Algeria in 1962, Islamic groups and movements have 
coexisted with the government and have exerted various degrees of influence on national 
policy. In the establishment of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), “the even more radical 
groups had existed for a long time and who had already taken up armed struggle such as El 
hijra oua takfir (Exile and Expiation) formed principally by the former Afghans or Kataeb el 
Qods (Brigades of Jerusalem) a pro-Shiite movement reportedly financed by the Iranians and 
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the Lebanese Hezbollah” (Imposimato 2001:3). The following were political parties and 
organizations: Uprising (Al-Qiyam), Repentance and Flight (At-Tekfir wal Hijra), Algerian 
Islamic Movement, Movement of the Islamic Society (HAMAS), Party of God (Hezbollah), 
and Renaissance Party (Harakat an-Nahda al-Islamiya).11 
It was understood from the term “Front” that the FIS was an umbrella organization 
that consisted of a coalition of more than twenty different Islamic groups opposed to the 
secular regime (Phillips 1995). Not surprisingly, the disharmony and divergent views in the 
Front soon appeared after the military riot in 1991. The FIS leaders increasingly have lost 
control over the ultra-radical guerrillas such as the GIA who do most of the fighting and 
adamantly reject compromise with the regime (Wictorowicz 2001:26-29).  
 The major turning point in the conflict was the involvement of the Salafi Algerian 
Afghan veterans such as Tayyeb el-Afghani, Jaffar al-Afhani, and Sharif al-Gusmi who 
undoubtedly played a primary role in the establishment and mobilization of the GIA and the 
AIS (Islamic Salvation Army) that would later take a side in the escalated bloody conflict 
between 1992 and 1998 in order to change the socio-political structure of the state from top 
to bottom (Wiktorowicz 2001:26-28). After the victory of the ten years Afghanistan war, 
many Algerian Salafis like other Arab Afghan veterans who have been trained and 
experienced in how to fight, introduced new ideological ideas to their own country, Algeria, 
that would become a basis for the jihadist organizations such as the GIA (Wiktorowicz 
2001:26; Esposito 2002:12). Therefore, the radical veterans frightened the secular ruling 
elite in Algeria as well as in other countries in the Middle East and North Africa lands 
(Wiktorowicz 2001:22, 26-27; Esposito 2002:11-13).  
                                                                 
11 Source: UNHCR Background paper on refugees and asylum seekers from Algeria. Geneva: Centre for Documentation and Research, 
October 1995. See more details at http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/cdr/cdrdza.htm. 
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In fact, Algerian radical groups who also share some common ideological grounds 
with the Saudi Arabia’s deeply conservative Wahhabism and Iran’s revolutionary Shi’i 
ideology, “attempted to export the religious justification for war to new contexts and 
enemies” (Wiktorowicz 2001:22). The Salafi groups who were radicalized with the Afghan 
mujahidin experience used the reinterpretations of Sayyid Qutb on the concepts of 
mufassala, jahiliyyah, takfir, and jihad and their discourses on the subject of battle and 
mobilized people against those identified as enemies and to legitimize their violent actions 
(Phillips 1995; Roy 1999; Zeidan 2001; Wiktorowicz 2001; Esposito 2002).  The concepts 
of the jahiliyyah and takfir for the radical armed groups under the umbrella of the GIA are 
not only applied to the single-party FLN government or the regime, but also to the entire 
society (Wiktorowicz 2001:26-29; Zeidan 2001:16). However, for the FIS which were 
originally moderate, this analysis is far too extreme. For the FIS, the problem was the 
government.  But, in the eyes of the armed groups, the government is secular and socialist, 
the state is corrupt, the regime is un-Islamic jahili, and the communities are in a state of 
ignorance.  
Especially in 1996, when Antar Zouabri took control of the GIA, he “inaugurated his 
new leadership with a fatwa that condemned anyone who did not directly assist the GIA. In a 
distorted adoption of the defensive jihad argument, Zouabri claimed that ordinary villagers 
were tacitly supporting the regime and thus offensive to Islam. The GIA argued that such 
behavior thus made them apostates. Ibn Taymiyyah’s argument was extended to include a 
defense against a population viewed as un-Islamic (jahili) because it did not actively rise up 
in the support of the GIA” (Wiktorowicz 2001:28). As result of the decentralization of takfir, 
they framed civilian populations as legitimate targets as well as the regime’s armed forces in 
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their distorted jihad mentality (Wiktorowicz 2001:28). According to the interview 
conducted by Mohammed Himeur for the BBC News and OTN in 1998 with Abu 
Mohammed a militant guerrilla of the GIA, the “people from the GIA consider that everyone 
who does not belong to them is actually an infidel (kuffar). Therefore, it is possible, the way 
they see it, to kill the entire people as infidels and all because they took part in the elections” 
(Himeur 1998). For Abu Mohammed, they are outside of religion. Alongside this interview, 
other interviews conducted by Terence McKenna for the CBC-CA television on June 9-16, 
2002 with Reda Hassaine who is an Algerian journalist, Abu Qatada who is one of the 
spiritual fathers of the GIA, and Zacarias Moussaoui who fought in Afghanistan and in 
Algeria under the GIA; and by Daniel Pipes on June 1998 with the GIA militants, support all 
these arguments. All three interviews12 show how the radical armed groups misunderstood 
the traditional Islamic concepts and how they used the radical interpretation of these 
concepts to legitimize their indiscriminate violent attitudes, behaviors and actions against all 
they view as a kafir (heretics, apostate and infidel) –an enemy in their mentality.  
In this sense, by making reference to Qutb’s interpretation: “Islam cannot accept any 
compromise with jahiliyyah, either in its concept or in its modes of living derived from this 
concept” (1990:101-102), they also killed more than 100 Algerian prominent religious 
figures such as Muhammad al-Said and Abd al-Razzak Radjam and high-ranking party 
members such as Abdelkader Hachani and Akbal Sahraoui who is founder of the FIS 
because of their opposition to use of violence and attacks on civilian people and attempts to 
“find a way out of this impasses, by forging new alliances with secular-minded liberals or 
the middle classes, on the basis of some mix of Islam and democracy” (Phillips 1995; 
                                                                 
12 See more details at http://www.megastories.com/islam/fighter/gia.htm, http://www.cbc.ca/national/news/recruiters.html and 
http://www.danielpipes.org/talks/19980630.shtml. 
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Wiktorowicz 2001:27; Kepel 2002:7). They were assassinated with the accusation of being 
a collaborator with the status quo and its corrupting influences seen as the enemy.   
Among the civilian targets of the GIA, there were the media, schools and foreign 
nationals. With radically interpreting Qutb’s concept of separation as purely spiritual and 
physical from jahili communities and structures, the GIA members claimed that one cannot 
work in establishments which belong to the government or allies because the curriculum in 
schools is contrary to Islam (AFP, August 6, 1994; Himeur 1998). Also, the “media was 
framed as merely an extension of the regime and thus an offensive tool to repress Islam. 
Similar criteria were used to justify attacks against schools. Since most schools in Algeria 
are controlled by the state, the GIA reasoned that they were un-Islamic institutions designed 
to support an unbeliever regime” (Wiktorowicz 2001:28). “By the end of 1994, GIA factions 
had assassinated 142 teachers. In all of these cases, GIA factions paid lip service to the 
defensive legitimation, as adapted from the call to arms in Afghanistan” (Wictotowicz 
2001:28). 
 However, “although many of those who were deprived of their democratic rights 
backed the insurgency at first, they took back their support in later years because of the 
GIA’s transgressed and misapplied Islamic principles in legitimization of their ultra-violent 
action and involvement in the killing of civilians” (Kepel 1997:7). This development led “to 
serious intra-Salafi clashes with various groups charging others with heresy” and the 
disintegration of the group as well as the withdrawal of support from the group. So, the 
GSPC under the former GIA commander Hassan Hattab, the Islamic Movement for 
Spreading the Faith, the Faithful to the Oath emerged in 1994 and 1998, allegedly as a 
counterweight to GIA (Wiktorowicz 2001:29).  
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5.1.2. TURKEY: towards the social contract 
While the heinous conflict in Algeria was continuing for the fifth year, the secular 
and leftist Kemalists were fervently arguing that Turkey would be the new Iran or Algeria 
after the Islamist Welfare Party gained a critical role as a coalition partner in order to form a 
new government in 1996. The Kemalist campaign against the coalition government resulted 
in the interruption of the democratic system by the military. In contrast to expectations, 
assumptions, and assertions, however, Turkey neither became Algeria nor were the WP 
followers inclined toward violent acts. So, why was Turkey not Algeriazed ?  
First of all, Turkey never experienced a group called “Turkish Afghan” like Algerian 
Afghan or Arab Afghan. Second, throughout its history, Turkey always kept its distance 
from Iran and Saudi Arabia staying far away from the ideologies of Shi’ism and Wahhabism 
(Lewis 1994; Yavuz 1999). Third, while Arab youth were nourished by the radical 
reinterpretations of the radical intellectuals such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Sayyid Qutb, the 
Turkish generation has been influenced by Yunus Emre, Mawlana, Ahmed Yasawi, 
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan, Mehmet Zahit Kotku, Fethullah Gulen, 
and other similar figures who went down in the history as the pillars of affection and 
tolerance. The most important thing is that Turkey is Turkish with a different culture, 
history, and customs to the Muslim countries which are mostly Arab.  
These main factors that prevented the Turkish Islamists from the propensity to 
violence and that also make Turkey different than Algeria are explained under the following 
headings.  
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5.1.2.1. The concept of Turkish Islam 
 The first factor is the concept of “Turkish Islam” which goes back to Ahmed Yasawi, 
Yunus Emre, and Mawlana Rûmi (Yavuz 1999; Gulen 2002). Turkish Islam is a moderate 
and unique Anatolian interpretation and understanding of Islam that is not reactionary 
toward what happened in the Arab world, but rather it is positive action (Lewis 1994; Yavuz 
1998; Erdogan 1999; Hardy 2002; Peuch 2003). As Amir Taheri claimed that “Turkish Islam 
is rich in mystical Sufi traditions” and “which is moderate and secular in outlook” (Taheri, 
quoted in Peuch 1999:3), Eric Zurcher said that Turkish Islam is different than Arab 
understanding and interpretation, and also there is no radicalization in Turkey (Milliyet, May 
6, 2003). Indeed, “Turks always have been open to Sufism, Islam’s spiritual aspect that has 
spread among Turks more than others” (Gulen in Turgut 1997).  
 Yavuz (1998) defines the term Turkish Islam in the context of the “neo-Ottoman 
ethos” that stems from Turkey’s Ottoman inheritance and Anatolian cultural identity. The 
neo-Ottoman ethos, especially at the civic level is “not based on blood or race, but rather on 
shared historical experiences and agreement to live democratically together within one 
polity” (Yavuz 1999:122). This cultural pluralism goes back to the Seljukî states and 
Ottoman Islamic legacies. In this context, Gulen argues that “if Ottoman tolerance existed in 
the world today, I believe there would be a very good basis for dialogue not only among 
Muslims but also among humanity” (Turgut 1997). Fairbanks asserts that “the foundations 
and essentials of Turkish Islam are more Sufistic and affluent than others” (in interview with 
Arslan 2001). It is not close to a narrow ideological understanding of Islam, but rather it is 
an openly moderate and tolerant model (Yavuz 1999; Frantz 2000). Gulen emphasizes this 
reality by saying that “the interpretations of Islam by Turks are very positive” (2002:98). In 
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order to highlight this difference between other nations, Gulen also used the concept of 
Turkish Islam. He said: “Muslims residing within modern Turkey’s borders did not receive 
Islam directly from Mecca and Medina. Although Islam entered Eastern Anatolia while 
advancing toward Asia, it was spread and established in Anatolia by the Central Asian 
Turks. Its interpretable aspects were interpreted by the Turkish nation. Jurisprudence, 
Hadith, and Qur’anic commentary (tafsir and ta’wil) developed in places where Turks were 
densely concentrated. The whole world of Islam is indebted to Mecca and Medina. Our 
second indebtedness is to Central Asia because of the renaissance that took place there in the 
fourth and fifth Islamic centuries. In fact, the seed of Islam sown and germinated in Mecca 
and Medina grew and became a universal tree in these regions. This is why I use the term 
“Turkish Islam” or “Turkish Muslimnes” to express this fact (Turgut 1997).  
The concept of Turkish Islam formally roots in the Hanafi interpretation of Sunni 
Islam (Yavuz 1999; Gulen in Unal 2000:54-58). “According to some, the founders (Abu 
Hanifa, Abu Yusuf, and Imam Muhammad) of the Hanafi school either were Turkish or had 
a connection with Turks” (Gulen in Turgut 1997). So, the worldview of the Hanafi school 
represents the Turkish culture and customs more than others. Today, 80% of the 96.9% of 
people who responded as Muslim in Turkey follow the Hanafi school while 5.8% are Shafi, 
3.9% are Alewi, and 1.5% are others (Toprak & Carkoglu 2000, graphic 6.1.2:42).  
In order to determine how Turkish people perceive, understand and practice their 
belief and in general Islam, many questions were asked in the surveys which were conducted 
in 1999 and published in 2000 by the TESEV (Social and Economic Study Foundation of 
Turkey). The results of the surveys confirm what is said above by the scholars. According to 
the results, the understanding of Islam by the Turkish people is positive and tolerant. For 
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example, the percentage of people who said that if a person believes in God and his 
messenger Muhammad, he or she is Muslim even if he or she does not perform namaz (pray) 
is 85.4%, even not fast during Ramadan is 82%, even drink alcohol is 66.3%. The 53.2% 
think that there could be good persons among people who do not believe in God.  The results 
also indicate that an overwhelming majority (91%) find that the protection of differences of 
belief in a social milieu of tolerance and peace is important for social harmony (Toprak & 
Carkoglu 2000:17-18). Another result is that the percentage of people who think that there 
can be good persons among people who believe in other than Islam is 89.2% while people 
who disagree are 4.2% (Toprak & Carkoglu 2000:83).  
In contrast to some Muslims in the Islamic world, Turkish Muslims “attempt to 
construct new ways based on both the original teachings of Islam and the realities of modern 
life” rather than “typically look to the way Muslims lived in the past” (Kubba 1996:87). In 
this context, Dr. Melikoff asserts that Turkish people are more tolerant and open for every 
kind of dialogue (Milliyet, May 6, 2003).   
5.1.2.2. Sufi religious brotherhood and Nur movement 
The second influential factor that discouraged the violence in Turkey is the moderate 
and reformist groups that are mostly dominant in Turkish daily life. These groups are Sufi 
brotherhoods that “disapprove of the fundamentalist interpretations of Islam. In contrast to 
the vigorous armed opposition groups in Algeria, they adopted and advocate a moderate and 
reformist rather than a revolutionary line in Turkey” (Heper 1997:35; Yavuz 1998; Taheri, 
quoted in Peuch 1999:3; Erdogan 1999; Gulen 2002). The Sufi groups who are composed of 
Naksibandis, Kadiris, Mawlavis, and Nurcus play a significant role in keeping the Turkish 
political life’s balance (Abusulayman 2002:42-43).  
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Being nonviolent in nature 
Their main characteristic is to be “nonviolent in nature” (Abusulayman 2002:42) and 
to truly represent a dynamic and positive understanding of Islam (Gulen 2002:98). Their 
humanistic interpretation and constructive understanding of Islam are unquestionably shaped 
by Yunus Emre, Mawlana Jalaladdin Rûmi, Ahmed Yasawi, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, 
Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan, Mehmet Zahit Kotku, Muhammed Lutfi, and other similar figures 
who went down in the history as the pillars of the affection and tolerance (Gulen 2002:96). 
In their understanding there are no such concepts like jahiliyyah and takfir. Instead, they 
practiced and showed Islam as entirely a religion of forgiveness and tolerance. The 
approaches of Yunus Emre and Mawlana Rumi who shaped the Sufi path with their 
overflowing sensations of love of God and creation, compassion and self-discipline are very 
good examples. As Rumi said, “come whoever you are,” he was representing this 
understanding of Islam. In the same parallel Yunus Emre said, “loving all creatures for the 
sake of the Creator.”  In their understanding and observing, the door is open for everyone 
regardless of how they look. People are accepted for how they look and how they are. 
Throughout the history, their messages about divine love, dialogue, and tolerance shaped 
Turkish public’s thought and attitudes. In this respect, “everyone will be accepted as they 
are, and no one will condescend to another because of their religion or lack of religion. No 
one will be looked down upon because of their way of dressing.” (Gulen 2000:98). 
“Turkey’s Islamic movement adheres to peaceful civil means in its call for reform. 
Its grassroots support is growing, despite the pain and constant pressure inflicted by 
Turkey’s secular ruling elite, because the Islamic movement is nonviolent in nature”. Its 
“commitment to nonviolence,” patience, and consultation in “internal political strife” 
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formatively differentiates from Algeria’s violent civil resistance (Abusulayman 2002:43-
44). Individually, Islamic movements “champion the freedom of conscience” and are 
“instrumental in moving Turkish democracy in more liberal direction” (Heper 1997:38). 
Scattering of the votes of Sufi groups 
The second distinguishing feature of the Sufi sociocultural groups in Turkey is to not 
indicate a monolithic block at one party, rather their preferences are scattered in the rightist 
parties (TPP and MP) (Ayata 1996:45; Heper 1997:33, 35; Yavuz 1999:3). If Sufi groups 
supported merely the religious minded parties, they would always be in power. However, the 
votes and seat the Welfare Party got in the 1996 general election was 21.3% of the total and 
158 of 500 seats could not carry it alone to establish a government. The results of the studies 
indicate that the rise up of the Islamist Welfare Party is not ideological appeal,13 but rather 
the dissatisfied people’s response to economic, social, and political discontent as well as 
secularization policy of the left-wing and liberal governments (Ayata 1996; Vergin 1996; 
Heper 1997; Narli 1999). The unsatisfied people voted for the Islamic-minded parties 
because they hoped that if Islamists had power, they would possibly bring a solution to their 
problems because there had been no strong government for a long time excepting the period 
of Turgut Ozal’s prime minister (1983-1989). The results of the surveys conducted by the 
TUSES (Social Economic Research Foundation of Turkey) in 1994-2002 and the TESEV 
(Social and Economic Study Foundation of Turkey) in 1999 show this reality.  
In Turkey traditionally the rightist parties represent the traditional values of the 
society while the leftist parties represent the values of the secularist regime. The support of 
Islamic groups at all the center-right parties based on symbolic, temporary, or long-term 
                                                                 
13 According to the 1994 poll revealed: only 1% of the party’s voters voted for the party because of Necmettin Erbakan. See, inter alia, 
Nokta, May 22-23, 1994. 
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affiliations. Their support was often contracted on “the process of exchanging votes and 
political support for access to public resources and protection against threats from the state 
and secular forces” (Ayata 1996:45). In this relationship, individually the Nur movement and 
Sufi Nakshibandi Sulaymancis, like Heper (1997) observed, played an influential role on the 
society. Before the military interruption in 1997, journalist Fehmi Koru, Huseyin Gulerce 
(Zaman, February 16, 1997), Ahmet Tasgetiren (Yenisafak, February 20, 1997), and 
Mehmet Barlas (Sabah, February 24, 1997) were arguing such phrases as “being like Iran” 
and “resembling Algeria,” pointing out the Islamic groups’ characteristics as well as their 
nonviolent nature.  
The findings show that an individual’s religiosity level influences whether he or she 
would vote for the PRP (leftist) or the WP (religious) in 1997 (See Table 3 at Appendix B). 
In this context, the results of the survey conducted in 1999 by the TESEV indicate that “the 
majority of people are practicing Muslims and devout believers. However, religious belief 
and practice is considered to be limited to private life and the idea of religious involvement 
in public life is not supported” (Toprak & Carkoglu 2000). For example, the finding 
indicates that 60.6% of the people do not want any party that makes politics based on 
religion in the Turkish party system while 24.6% support a religious party (Toprak & 
Carkoglu 2000:58). The argument about the reason why they do not want it is that the 
Islamist WP used the religious symbols as political tools. For the 24.6%, the argument is 
made for democracy and human rights (Toprak & Carkoglu 2002). 
Other studies conducted in 1995, 1996, 1998, and 2002 by the TUSES show that the 
majority of people do not want Turkey to be ruled with the Shari’ah system. While the 
percentage of people who want the Shari’ah system is 9.9% of total, 60.7% do not want it 
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(See Table 2 at Appendix B). Even though the percentage of people who want an Islamic 
state in Turkey was relatively high (21%) in 1996, the answers to a number of questions 
designed to find out what exactly people understand from an Islamic state suggest that this 
percentage is actually much less (Toprak & Carkoglu 2000:59-60). Another argument for the 
rise of a Shari’ah system is the success of the WP in the municipal administration and 
disclosure of the corruptions made by some leftist PRP mayors at that time (Milli Gazatte, 
December 17, 1995; Yenisafak, February 9, 1996). However, there is a positive relationship 
between educational level and Shari’ah support. As education level rises (from primary to 
graduate school), the percentage of the Shari’ah support decreases (6.3%) and the percentage 
of the people who do not a Shari’ah system increases (91.1%) (TUSES 2002:30).  
In the escalated politic polemic in 1990s when Erbakan individually made an 
imprudent speech as a politic tactic in order to increase his votes (Heper 1997:37), Sufi 
Iskender Pasha community leader Esad Cosan who is successor of Mehmet Zahit Kotku who 
encouraged Erbakan to establish the party in 1970s (Heper 1997:35) strongly reproved and 
warned him. Cosan said: “You are saying that I am chief for jihad. You are nothing. Is there 
a war in Turkey that you are talking about jihad or sending people who do not vote for you 
into the Hell? Those people are your brothers. A Muslim cannot make a jihad against a 
Muslim. This is not jihad. Our way is the method of the Sufism. What happened to you? 
What changed you? In fact, our method is not this. Our method is love, brotherhood, and 
tolerance. We support you until January 1990, but now we will do not.” (Cakir 1999: 50-52).  
This speech shows the differences between the Sufi groups and Erbakan. Especially 
his polemically imprudent remarks in April 1994 brought harsh accusatory responses from 
all the religious brotherhoods. Therefore, in later years some Sufi groups lessened and some 
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cut their support (Cakir 1991:48-54). Its evidence is the general election on November 3, 
2002 that total vote of Erbakan’s party (Saadet) got was two percent of the total. In fact, the 
Sufi movements displayed distinctively more tolerable and moderate views and attitudes 
than Erbakan and his colleagues in the leadership position of the party (Heper 1997:35) who 
does not even “mean militant in content” (Ayata 1996:40). 
Cosan and his movement like the Nur and Sulaymanci movements strongly oppose 
those who are making religion a tool of politics. According to Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan who 
is founder of the Nakshi Suleymanci movement, for example, “religion is essential, politics 
is secondary. So, religion cannot be a tool for the world’s interest and politics. Maybe 
politics can serve religion. There is a curse for those who make it a tool for politics” 
(Muradoglu 2003). 
The apolitical Nur movement 
The school of Nur thought within the Sufi brotherhood is another distinguishing 
feature for the Sufi groups in Turkey. The Nur school differentiates itself from others as 
adopting a stance above politics. It is the largest and most influential sociocultural 
movement among the Sufi groups that influence the understanding and way of other groups 
and the politics of the political parties in Turkey. In contrast to what the GIA and other 
radical groups did by negative means in Algeria, this apolitical group played an efficiently 
constructive role in the Turkish political struggle.  
The Nur movement formed, shaped, and developed within the framework of the 
writings, perspectives and opinions of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1877-1960), who was one 
of the most important personalities of the final period of the Ottoman Empire and of the 
Turkish Republic, is today successfully represented by the Fethullah Gulen community, 
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which “promotes a moderate brand of Islam” (Douglas Frantz, The New York Times, 
August 25, 2000). The Nur school’s method is “positive action” (Nursi 1959:ii, 241) and “is 
very different from reactionary projects which seek to revive and restore the past” (Michel 
2002:104).  
The Nur movement strongly opposes both those who are “making religion a tool for 
politics” and those who are “wanting to make politics a tool of irreligion.” As Nursi states 
“politics revolving around interest is a monster” (1959:i, 38), Gulen claims that “politicizing 
religion would be more dangerous for religion than for the regime, for such people want to 
make politics a means for all their ends” (quoted in Unal 2002:166). Nursi claims that the 
great majority of Islamic parties in the Islamic world are confused about what the benefit for 
the country is, because of a power struggle. This struggle promotes an extreme partisanship 
among supporters. (1959:38). Also, as such people want to make Islam a tool of politics by 
using such Islamic symbols, some use it to screen their personal aims and self- interests 
(Nursi 1959:39). Accordingly, the social and political consequence of this partisanship is to 
completely destroy the affection, brotherhood, foundations of unity, and consensus among 
the Muslim public (Nursi 1959:283). Therefore, this malaise naturally becomes one of the 
explanations of the Islamism’s failure in the Islamic world.  
 “Since they are critical of the ‘instrumentalization’ of religion in politics, they 
constantly criticize the policies of the National Outlook Movement which represents the 
political Islam of Necmettin Erbakan because of “their different perceptions of what the old 
and new social contracts mean to Turkish society” (Yavuz 1999:126). The foundation of 
distance between political Islam and the Gulen community lies in the accusation of wanting 
to make religion a tool of politics. The movement’s adherents argue that “Islam is the 
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religion of the nation and should not be reduced to being the identity of one party” (Yavuz 
1999:126). For them, Islam is “not a political project to be implemented but rather a 
repository of knowledge and practices for the evolution of a just and ethical society” (Yavuz 
1999:126). 
 Nursi’s positive approach through the situations is a good answer for people who 
often use the jahiliyyah analogy in order to call rulers as kuffar or to accuse one of being in a 
state of ignorance and un-Islamic. His reinterpretations and reevaluations on such concepts 
are always constructive, positive, and moderate. In this sense, “Gulen repeatedly affirms that 
if there is no adaptation to new conditions, the result will be extinction” (Michel 2002:105).  
In the Nur thought Gulen community’s “moderate policy had been very effective in 
the prevention of further tension” at the times of the “headscarf issue” in the 1990s and 
during the destructive campaign of the leftist and secular Kemalist circle against Necmettin 
Erbakan’s Islamist Welfare Party in the coalition government with the True Path of Tansu 
Ciller before the military interruption in 1997 (Ozkok 1994). In order to prevent the society 
from being drawn into domestic conflict, Gulen met (and continues to meet) with many 
“political leaders, members of the administration, religious leaders, journalists, columnists, 
television and film stars, academics, and intellectuals from all social segments (Unal 2002: 
6-8, 205-300). He gives the same message to them all: “Show tolerance to those with 
different ideas and beliefs, love each other, world for unity, and serve others by educating 
them” (Unal 2002:v-vi). In contrast to the radical interpretations in the Arab world, Gulen 
brings a broad meaning to the concept of jihad. “Tolerance already exists in our people’s 
spirit. So, we must make jihad (struggle) for tolerance” (Sevindi 1997:44).  In this respect, 
“in order to promote dialogue and internal social and political peace within the Turkish 
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society, The Foundation of Journalists and Writers (of the Gulen community) has 
organized and continues to organize many activities” (Zaman, October 2, 1996).  
The concept of obedience 
The final characteristic of the Sufi groups, in general Turkish Muslims, is their 
Hanafi Sunni perspectives on the concept of “obedience”. Around 80 percent of Turkish 
Muslims are the Hanafi (Toprak & Carkoglu 2000:42). The Hanafi school is one of the main 
sources of Turkish Islam. In this context, Soner Cagaptay points out that “the Turkish Islam 
has a traditional and historical tendency, going back to the Ottoman times, to recognize the 
(secular) authority as the supreme power and not to defy that or fight against that. Turkish 
Islam in general does not have a tradition of either controlling the state or dictating policies 
to the state” (quoted in Peuch 2003:4). So, it is important to know how Turkish Muslims 
approach and understand the concept of obedience in the political context.  
Contrary to the other schools of jurisprudence, the Hanafi school has rich 
methodology in the interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet. The “Hanafi 
school of jurisprudence found and developed its method such as Qiyas (deductive 
reasoning), Istihsan (preferring closed to open analogy or preferring an exceptional law to 
the general law), Istishab (preserving the existing legal situation and accepting it as the 
norm), and Sedd-i zerayi (prohibiting that which leads to what is forbidden)” (Turgut 1997). 
More importantly, the Hanafi school does not stress the literal belief in the Qur’an and 
Hadith (Turgut 1997).  
Unlike other schools, the Hanafi school has a juridical statement on the institution of 
sovereignty that a thousand years of tyranny is preferable to one day of anarchy. In contrast 
to some who reinterpreted the traditional concepts of jahiliyyah and takfir in their attempts to 
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justify the use of force against other Muslims and against state-regime, for those in the 
Hanafi understanding the “obedience to legitimate the authority is a religious obligation as 
well as a political necessity” while disobedience is “a sin as well as a crime” (Lewis 1994:9; 
Gulen in Unal 2002:170-174). For evidence of this argument, the following verse and hadith 
are showed: “O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger Muhammad, and 
those of you who are in authority” (Qur’an, 4:59). “If a person observes in his ruler what he 
dislikes, he should show patience because he who departs from the (Muslim) community a 
cubit, dies like those who died in the Days of Ignorance” (Bukhari, Edeb 99).  
In the environment in which secular state-regimes are seen as jahili by most Arabs, 
Nursi brings a new approach to the concept of “obedience”. For him, “the sphere of belief 
should not be confused with the sphere of (social) relations” (1993:34). “The government is 
a servant. If constitutionalism is truly (applied), the governors, kaimakams and mayors are 
not rulers but paid servants. (In this context,) non-Muslims cannot be rulers, but they can be 
servants” (1993:39-40). In fact, this is a very sensitive balance that the radical Muslims 
cannot see in today’s political struggle. 
The Sufi brotherhoods always stay away from accusing someone with disbelief 
(takfir) (Nursi 1986:423). As seen in their writings, for example, Nursi and later Gulen 
always avoid this social ill and constantly warn people accusing someone as disbelief (takfir) 
like the GIA in Algeria or Kharijis in the early Islamic history. They strongly encourage 
Muslims to think positively by showing following hadith: “If someone calls his brother a 
disbeliever, one of them has certainly become one. If the one accused of being a disbeliever, 
is not, the accusation will turn on the one who made it.” (Muslim, Iman, 1764). That is why 
Nursi ruled as, “thinking favorably (hüsn-ü zan) is essential for every Muslim” (1993:79).  
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In contrast to the Khariji and Wahhabi arguments, Nursi also argues that those who 
commit serious sins are not unbelievers (1993:79). However, for the Kharijites those who 
committed grievous sins were unbelievers and would remain in the hell (jehennem) forever, 
while the Mu‘tazilehs said that those who committed grievous sins were neither believers 
nor unbelievers but were between the two (1993:79-80). These group’s deviation from the 
truth and fall into misguidance became an inspiration for Algeria’s extremists.  
 As said in the following hadith: “Listen to them whom in authority and obey them. 
They are responsible for their obligations and you are accountable for yours” (Imam Nevevî, 
Edeb 733), the balance between obedience and disobedience based on an element of contract 
and consent between sovereign and subject for the Sunni doctrine of sovereignty (Lewis 
1994:9-10). In the Sufi understanding, people are debarred from disobeying a ruler who 
neglects to do what is required of him, because negligence is not rectifiable by negligence; 
as it will make matters worse and as it will cause mischief at the cost of the unity and 
common interests of the community. The relationship, Gulen states, between ruler and ruled 
and their duties to each other “should continue in mutual harmony. … If state is run by good 
people, it will be perfect. If this is not possible, so you cannot reconcile with any logic and 
the idea like that: if it is not perfect, we shouldn’t accept the imperfect. Let them go to Hell” 
(Can 1995). Gulen states the religious legal opinion: “Something that cannot be achieved 
fully should not be abandoned completely” (Can 1995). He argues, “if we approach any 
issue from the perspective of absolute beauty, we will be critical and suspicious of every 
system.” So, “if criticism is made in the name of destroying without the intention of 
improving and showing what is better, it is hundred percent harmful. It causes anarchy, 
pessimism, lack of trust in the state, and finally chaos” (Can 1995).  
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Similarly, Nursi states that “we are the descendants of the great nation who served 
Islam. We are Muslim and brother in Islam. So, we cannot allow a brother to fight with 
another brother. This is prohibited by the Shari’ah” (Cakir 1991:80). A similar statement was 
also made by Esad Cosan in 1990s against Necmettin Erbakan.  
In fact, this understanding and perspective on the “institution of sovereignty became 
hereditary” with time (Lewis 1994:9). In this confirmation, as Deniz Baykal who is the 
leader of the left-wing secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) claimed that “there is no 
tyrannicalness in our culture and history. We are a nation who took peace, tolerance, and 
reconciliation as essential” (Zaman, July 2, 2003), he was pointing out this reality. 
Accordingly, as Lewis argued, this heredity has played undoubtedly a formative role in the 
nonviolent struggles of Turkish Muslims. 
5.2. The Impact of the sociopolitical cultural heritage 
The sociopolitical development of country is another factor that may play a formative 
role in preventing people from becoming involved in violent action. The sociopolitical 
cultural background of each country also has a considerable impact on how people behave 
and act in future conflict and how they interpret and understand the religious texts in order to 
solve this problem. This section seeks the answers for the second research question the paper 
aimed at. I am going to comparatively examine each country’s sociopolitical cultural 
heritage under the following headings.  
 
5.2.1. The characteristic of the legacy 
Contrary to Algeria’s short independent history, Turkey “was never colonized, never 
subject to imperial rule or domination, as were almost all the Islamic lands of Asia and 
Africa. The Turks were always “masters in their own house,” and, indeed, in many other 
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houses, for a long period. When their mastery was finally challenged, they won their war 
of independence, and therefore were able to achieve a degree of realism, a detachment, and 
of self-criticism that is not possible in countries” (Lewis 1994:5; Koru 1997). Before having 
collapsed, the Ottoman State was transformed by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk into a modern 
European republic known as Turkey in 1923. At this date, Algeria was still under the 
physical and spiritual colonization of France.  
After the long Ottoman governing, Algeria was ruled by France until its 
independence in 1962. Therefore, its sociopolitical culture was mostly influenced by France 
than Turkish culture. Although the democratic institutions in Algeria were bequeathed by the 
departed France, the system was more socialist and authoritarian than Islamic one. The 
struggle (jihad) of people during the independence period against their colonizer master was 
transferred into the scene of the failures of social and public policies of the single-party 
authoritarian governments (Koru 1997). This reactionary attitude and behavior nourished by 
the infiltration of alien culture and the pressure of the ruling elite frustrated people and made 
them aggressive. Therefore, the way they behaved and acted became similar to the past. This 
similarity eased them toward the radical goals and acts in the name of religion. 
 In contrast to the Algerian’s reactionary culture influenced by the radical 
reinterpretations of Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn 
Taymiyyah, Dawud Khalaf, and others who insisted on strict adherence to the literal 
interpretations on the traditional Islamic concepts, Turkish Muslims are inheritors of the 
Seljuks and Ottomans. One of the most interesting assertions is that “Islam reached Turkey 
from Central Asia. This region produced some of the most important figures in the history of 
Islam, and it was from such people that Turkey received Islam. The Central Asians 
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transferred their deep spirituality and tolerance to the Seljuks, who passed it on to the 
Ottomans. These were the people who would set up the Ottoman State, whose tolerance for 
religious and ethnic minorities amazed visiting Europeans” (Unal 2002:iii). This culture  was 
dominated by Yunus Emre, Mawlana Rumi, Ahmed Yasawi, Bediuzzaman, Suleyman 
Tunahan, Zahit Kotku, Muhammed Lutfi, and other similar figures who are accepted as the 
pillars of the affection and tolerance (Gulen 2002:96). It is not a reactionary culture, rather it 
is characterized by peace, tolerance, and reconciliation (Baykal 2003). Accordingly, this 
culture has a constructive role in the building of social peace and effective dialogue as well 
as an atmosphere of tolerance, respect, and understanding among people from all social 
segments in Turkey.  
5.2.2. The struggle with modernization and democratization  
 Turkey’s struggle with modernization and democratization processes dates back to 
the period of the Tanzimat Fermani. This was the first social and political reforms 
introduced by the Sultan Abdulmecid and ulema (intellectuals) in 1839. The further reforms 
were the constitutionalist movements in 1861 and 1866 that would bring the final 
achievement of the first Ottoman constitution (Mesrutiyet) in 1876 (Baser 1999:145).  These 
democratic developments were “an important element in the ultimate triumph of 
constitutional and representative government in the Turkish Republic” (Lewis 1994:6, 10). 
In fact, “the Turkish experiment in parliamentary democracy has been going on for a century 
and a quarter that much longer than in Algeria as well as in any other country in the Islamic 
world, and its present progress therefore rests on a far stronger, wider, and deeper base of 
experience” (Lewis 1994:6; Koru 1997). The Turkish governments perhaps “wisely did not 
attempt to introduce full democracy all at once,” but instead “went through successive 
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phases of limited democracy, laying the foundation for further development, and, at the 
same time, encouraging the rise of civil society” (Lewis 1994:6).  
 The most important thing is that the “democratic institutions were neither imposed by 
the victors, as happened in the defeated Axis countries, nor bequeathed by departing 
imperialists, as happened in the former British and French dependencies, but were 
introduced by the ‘free choice’ of the Turks themselves” (Lewis 1994:5). However, Turkey’s 
road to democratic progress has not been easy. In this period, there have been three 
interruptions by the military force. In contrast to all norms in the political culture in the other 
countries, exceptionally “the military always withdrew to its barracks and allowed, even 
facilitated, the resumption of the democratic process. Since then, Turkey has passed the test 
of democratic change not just once, but several times” (Lewis 1994:5).  
Despite all these obstacles, Turkish Republic is comparably the only democratic 
country in the Islamic world (Lewis 1994). But, this cannot be the whole explanation. Also, 
Turkey has the longest and closest relationship with the West that played the significant 
factor in its modernization and democratization process and development (Lewis 1994:6). 
Turkey is the only Muslim member of NATO and the close ally of the United States. Also, it 
is almost at the end of the road map to be accepted as a full candidate for membership of the 
European Union (Lewis 1994:6; Hardy 2002; West 2002). According to the results of the 
survey conducted in 1996, 1998 and 2002 by TUSES, the majority of the population wants 
Turkey to join the European Union (See Table 2 at Appendix B). The differences within the 
percentages of the responses between 1998 and 2002 are related to the attitude and behavior 
of the countries in the European Union. The response for the overwhelming reason of not 
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wanting the EU is the dependency on the outside with 47.5%, with 19.4% noting cultural 
and ethical reasons (TUSES 2002, graphic 13:121).  
 Many observers have attached great importance to the relationship between 
economic growth and democratic development for social and political stability and 
continuity within the country. The stability brings an end to the closed social and political 
models which make radicalism and terrorism possible. In this sense, “the fact is that Turkey, 
alone among the Muslim countries, has achieved a significant economic growth and a 
substantial rise in the standard of living, and this by its own efforts, not by some fortunate 
accident, such as the presence of oil in the subsoil” (Lewis 1994:6). The Turkish economy is 
not based on the oil wealth like Algeria’s. The oil wealth prevents the development of 
industry and service sectors as independent from the state. It is the big obstacle to the 
democratization process. In this kind of country, generally the single-party governments are 
in power. 
 Despite some difficulties, the success of the Turkish democracy, as compared to 
Algeria’s background, traditions, and experience, have been remarkable. Its advancement in 
modernization and democratization for more than half a century is for more successful than 
Algeria’s attempts (Koru 1997).  
Also, the places in which democracy exists create and maintain free institutions and 
produce more free civil societies. The extent of the democratic progress determines the 
emergence and consolidation of intermediate powers (Lewis 1994:9-10). In this context, 
Turkey is more successful than Algeria in the movements for a constitutional and 
representative government since the beginning of the nineteenth century. As both the Islamic 
and Ottoman heritages, the civil society culture already existed in Turkey (Lewis 1994:9-
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10). The political culture in which the heritage where religion and ethics have been more 
concerned with duties than with rights took on a new meaning under the political Islam in 
Turkey. As seen in the Justice and Development Party, today, Islamic social and political 
movements and organizations in Turkey are greater advocators of democracy, human rights, 
and the attempt to enter the European Union than the Kemalist secular bureaucracy which 
supports the status quo.  Contrary to Turkish Islamic movements, particularly radical groups 
under the umbrella of the GIA in Algeria are against the West and democracy. They view the 
democracy against the God’s “sovereignty”, and so as a jahili system that must be expelled 
by jihad. While they were criticizing the secular, socialist, and authoritarian regime, they 
were demanding the traditional authoritarian system. They were contradicting themselves.  
In the modernization processes and progression, conflict sometimes can be an 
opportunity for societies as means of social change. In this sense, the (secular) cultural 
transformation which began with the Tanzimat reforms in 1839 and continued with Ataturk 
and his successors has conditionally played a positive role14 even though people complain 
about the state’s secular policies. As democracy has been advancing, the “political Islam has 
been changed itself in the nature in Turkey” (Peuch 2003:5). While “Islamists have been 
increasingly reincorporated into the political system,” they gradually changed their attitude 
“from the anti-regime stance to a pro-regime one” (Heper 1997:33; Toprak & Carhoglu 
2000). The Justice and Development Party which represents the broad voters from all trends 
(See table 5 at Appendix B) is the result of this trend and change. Today, the JDP is more 
reminiscent of Europe’s Christian Democrat parties than any Islamist parties in the countries 
in the Islamic world. Perhaps, all changes were unintended consequences but credibly 
                                                                 
14 According to the survey report (by Toprak and Carkoglu. 1999. “Political Islam in Turkey”. Istanbul: TESEV Publication), even the 
religiously conservative people tend to support the separation of the state and Islam and they are not for an Islamic state.  
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differentiate Turkey’s political Islam from Algeria.  
5.3. Islamic perceptions on jihad, extremism, violence and terrorism 
This section is the analysis of my third research question. I will explain the answers 
of Islam to questions about jihad, extremism, violence, and terrorism. First I will survey into 
the traditional concept of jihad.  
5.3.1. The concept of Jihad 
Jihad literally means exertion, striving, struggling in the Qur’an and Hadiths in the 
Qutub-u Sitte (Six Hadith Collection Books). The “Arabic term jihad, usually translated into 
European languages as “holy war”, more on the basis of its juridical usage in Islam rather 
than on its much more universal meaning in the Qur’an and Hadith, is derived from the root 
jhd whose primary meaning is to strive or to exert oneself” (Nasr 1999:1).  
In traditional juridico-religious context, jihad occurs on two fronts: the internal and 
the external that “was inspired by the hadith that the Prophet pronounced whenever he came 
back form battle:” “We are finished with the lesser jihad. Now we are starting the greater 
jihad” (Bukhari, jihad: 934; Muslim, siyar: 75; Thirmizi, jihad: 118, in the Qutub-u Sitte), 
“meaning from military action to civilian work” (Kishtainy 2001). The “internal one can be 
described as the effort to attain one’s essence; the external one as the process of enabling 
someone else to attain his or her essence. The first is the greater jihad; the second is the 
lesser jihad. The first is based on overcoming obstacles between oneself and his or her 
essence, and the soul’s reaching knowledge and eventually divine knowledge, divine love, 
and spiritual bliss. The second is based on removing obstacles between people and faith so 
that people can have a free choice to adopt a way” (Gulen 2002:52).  
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The most important jihad is the greater jihad that means to root out ‘I-ness,’ 
meaning our inner world and ego or nafs in Arabic. It is to liberate ‘myself from me’ and to 
liberate from the slavery of our current desires. To give up ‘I-ness’ is the most difficult and 
longest struggle. That is why the Prophet called it the greater jihad (Gulen 2002:52-53). In 
order to be good person the greater jihad is ordained in many verses in the Qur’an (2:288; 
3:142; 9:16).  
Nasr (1999) pointed out this kind of jihad can be achieved in the three ways that are 
explained in the Qur’an: with tongue (speaking the truth) (16:125; 29:8), with heart (feeling 
and intentions) (22:78; 29:6), and with hand (good works) (29:69).  
Sufism is  mostly based on the understanding of the greater jihad, spirituality. What a 
real Sufist does is to strive to live, guided by the five pillars of Islam (Faith in the Unity of 
God [Tawhid] –to reinforce surrender to God, Pray [Salah] –to develop faith in God, Charity 
[Zakat] –for self-purification, Fasting [Sawm] –to develop self-discipline, and Pilgrimage 
[Hajj] –to promote solidarity) to overcome the selfishness and arrogance of human nature 
(Nasr 1999: 1-5). 
In this context, Yasin argued like Gulen (2002) that jihad in its general meaning is 
“the determination to do right, to do justice even against your own interests. Especially today 
it is a struggle that exists on many levels: self-purification and awareness, public service and 
social justice. On a global scale, it is a struggle involving people of all ages, colors, and 
creeds for control of the Big Decisions: not only who controls what piece of land, but more 
importantly who gets medicine, who can eat. But, before looking outward, we must first look 
inward. Before deciding what we are against, we must decide what we are for” (2002:44). 
 70 
The “lesser jihad does not mean to fight on the battlefronts exclusively. In reality, 
the lesser jihad has so broad a meaning and application that sometimes a word or silence, a 
frown or a smile, leaving or entering an assembly –in short, everything done for God’s sake– 
and regulating love and anger according to His approval is included in it. In this way, all 
efforts made to reform society and people are part of jihad, as is every effort made for your 
family, relatives, neighbors, and region” (Kishtainy 2001; Gulen 2002:52). 
The fighting in Islam was described and defined in the Islamic Law what is known 
among Western jurists as “just war” (Nasr 1999; Kishtainy 2001; Gulen 2002; Safi 2002; 
Mostafa 2003). This lesser jihad is neither “simply holy war –aggression to enforce one’s 
religious beliefs on others” nor “a divine license that some consider to enforce their will on 
infidels, including fellow Muslims who do not hold their views” (Safi 2002:24). A Muslim’s 
duty is simply “to do good and prevent harm and evil in every possible way” that “is not 
very much different from the current American foreign policy missionary statements” 
(Mostafa 2003:2).  
The classical doctrine of war and peace in Islam was influenced by the prevailing 
political structure and developed upon the essential propositions of the Dar al-Islam (the 
Abode of Islam, the area subject to Islamic law) and Dar al-Harb (the Abode of War, the 
area not yet brought under Islamic rule). This classical doctrine of jihad was the product of 
the early fuqaha’s (jurists) ideas and doctrines shaped by the Byzantium’s imperial politics 
and the Abbasid State’s conquest-occupation by the Mongols in 1258. The traditional 
concept was used to determine the different types of external Islamic relations with others 
and was “the governing norm between Islam and other political powers” (Safi 2002:24-26). 
For the classical jurists and traditionalists, it used to fit a context of the world divided into 
 71 
Muslim and non-Muslim zones in the political struggle.  They “often equated jihad with 
war, a conception that failed to capture the full range of its rich meaning, and reduced it to a 
military term denoting fighting and war. While the Qur’an often uses jihad to refer to war, it 
gives the term a broader meaning. The term jihad was introduced in the Qur’an –29:6, 69 
and 25:52— long before Muslims were permitted to fight” (Safi 2002:24). This one for 
Muslims in the Mecca era was the greater jihad. But, “after the migration to Medina, 
Muslims were allowed to fight those who declared war against them” (22:39-40) with also 
description of the limits of war (2:190). This one meant the lesser jihad that was a 
“defensive” or “just” war (Abusulayman 2002:40; Gulen 2002:52-53).  
Jihad is sometimes reflected as the sixth pillar of Islam by some contemporary 
radical sects such as the Wahhabis.  In contrast to the Sunnah of the Prophet who practiced it 
as meant in the Qur’an, for the Kharijis there is no classification for the concept of jihad. In 
their interpretation, jihad was viewed as a “holy war” that means to fight against anything 
what they see or feel as un-Islamic, including their rulers. Accordingly, “their aggressive 
attitude was seen as a kind of spiritual totalitarianism” (Mostafa 2002:3). The contemporary 
radical groups like the GIA follow the steps of the Kharijis. But, as Esposito (2002) claims 
in his book, Unholy War: Terror in the name of Islam, their war is not jihad rather it is 
“unholy” war made in the name of the religion. 
Through the last century the understanding of jihad narrowed gradually and took new 
forms and shapes, without examining the nature of historical, social, and psychological 
background of the classical doctrine of jihad, which was developed in the 13th century’s 
political structure. In this new development, “the Western colonization on and control of the 
Muslim world seriously challenged the classical approach of thought as well as the (secular 
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or totalitarian) policies of Muslim states” such as Algeria. This new trend “took the form 
either of apologetics or of protest and revolt against” the influences of Western thought and 
power in the Islamic world (Mostafa 2003:5). As a result, the “apologetic trend appealed to 
liberalism and over-emphasized peace, freedom and tolerance. This trend was a weapon to 
reform Muslim nations. This reform was considered the main way to get rid of European 
occupation that threatened not only the land but also all the values of Islam. This was typical 
of the ruling Ottoman elite and its movements of the nineteenth century and of the reformers 
who came in contact with the West. The other response to the European domination was 
military. Aimed at the liberation of the Muslim land, it was organized by people and their 
traditional leadership such as Al-Jaza’iri in Algeria” (Mostafa 2003:5). This trend after the 
promised independence was continued as a result of the failure of some states like Algeria to 
create a cohesive society.  
In one sense, the balance must be established between the internal and external 
relations (Qur’an 29:69). God leads those who strive for His sake the middle road. The 
balance and the middle path are very important for “those who remember to save themselves 
while saving others.” So, “those who fail in the greater jihad will fail in the lesser jihad’s 
application.” (Gulen 2002:53).  
5.3.2. The concepts of extremism, violence and terrorism 
 Terrorism is a worldwide threat that stems from a consequence of extremism and 
violence. It is a form of unjust war. Extremism is a state of being situated at the farthest 
possible point from the center that can be found in behavior as well as thought. Violence as 
an extreme action has been occasionally committed for various purposes by people from all 
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religious and political (including social and economic) backgrounds since the time of 
Adam’s son Cain who was the first murderer that the Bible describes.  
Violence has a long and complex geneology. At different times different religions 
have been used as a cover for the political goals of sections of societies. In the last decades, 
“radical groups have combined nationalism, ethnicity, or tribalism with religion and used 
violence and terrorism to achieve their goals: Serbs in Bosnia, Hindu nationalists in India, 
Tamil and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, Jewish fundamentalists in Israel, Christian extremists in 
the United States” (Esposito 2002:151). Worldwide the IRA militants are also among these 
groups. However, the most often cited example of religious violence has occurred in the 
Middle East and North Africa which were related to the division of oil markets among the 
Imperialist countries after the World War II.  
Extremism is contrary to what God said in his books and what He said to all his 
Messengers (Gulen in Unal 2000:126-129). Al-Qardawi (1982) argues that Islam always 
seeks to create and encourages the balance and moderation in everything for this life and the 
hereafter. God says that “[T]hus have we made of you an ummah (community) justly 
balanced, that you might be witnesses over the nations, and the Messenger a witness over 
yourselves” (Qur’an, 2:143). God tells all human beings, “O people! We have formed you 
into nations and tribes so that you may know one another” (49: 13) –not to conquer, convert, 
subjugate, revile or slaughter but to reach out toward others with intelligence and 
understanding. As said, “[L]et not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and 
depart from Justice. Be just: that is next to piety: and fear God” (Qur’an, 5:8), God also 
cautions against conflict. The Qur’an guards itself against unreasonable literal interpretation. 
However, fundamentalists use it to mask their bad and violent acts and make it the weapon 
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of fanaticism (Garaudy 1995). In fact, all “Islamic texts call upon Muslims to excretes 
moderation and to reject and oppose all kinds of extremism: qhuluq (excessiveness), tanattu’ 
(transgressing; meticulous religiosity) and tashdid (strictness; austerity)” (Qardawi 1982:6). 
While Prophet Muhammad was warning Muslims by saying “beware of excessiveness in 
religion” or “do not exceed the limits of your religion,” he “always condemned any tendency 
toward religious excessiveness” and “cautioned those of his companions who were excessive 
in ibadah (pray) or who were too ascetic, especially when this went beyond the moderate 
Islamic position” (Qardawi 1982:7). As al-Qardawi claimed, when referring to the Islamic 
texts, they prove that Islam emphatically admonishes against and discourages all kinds of 
extremism (1982:7-8; Gulen 2002:64, 72). 
 Extremists are bigoted, intolerant and refuse any dialogue with others whether 
Muslim or non-Muslim. They quickly give their judgment and easily accuse people, contrary 
to accepted norm: “innocent until proven guilty.” They occasionally call such rulers who do 
not apply Islamic law, as well as people who submit to rulers in bid’ah, laxity, kufr, and 
deviation. Also, they often label people who (Muslim or non-Muslim) disagree with them 
and reject their beliefs and actions, as kafir, and so occasionally call them jihad.  
However, Islam encourages the acceptance of plurality (5:51, 10:19, 11:118-119), 
interfaith dialogue (29:46), peaceful co-existence (60:8-9), universal brotherhood (49:13), no 
forced “conversion” (2:256), and also gives a special place for Jews and Christians. 
Accusing a Muslim of being a kafir (unbeliever, heresy) is, in fact, a very serious matter in 
Islam. The Prophet said, “when a Muslim calls another Muslim as kafir, then surely one of 
them is such” (Bukhari, Edeb 44). This means that unless the accusation is validated and 
substantiated, it will fall back on the accuser, who will face great danger in this world and in 
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the hereafter. The GIA in Algeria, Jamaat al Takfir in Egypt or Usama b. Laden seems to 
be following in the footsteps of the Khawarij who were known as extremist and deviated 
from the right path with their belief and behavior. In fact, these kinds of reactions are stark 
violations of the spirit and teachings of Islam. Islam condemns this kind of violation. Islam 
encourages Muslims to think well of others, to find an excuse for their misbehavior, and to 
help them improve their words and deeds (Nursi 1993:79-80).  
 For Islam, a Muslim cannot attack, hurt, and kill civilians or noncombatants nor kill 
himself even as a suicide bomber (Zeidan 2001:20; Gulen 1999). Islam gives the greatest 
value to human life by saying that “whosoever kill a human being for other than 
manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if he had killed all mankind, and 
whosoever save the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind” (Qur’an, 
5:32). A prophetic hadith also emphasizes this verse: “if a person is killed unjustly, without 
exception some of that sin will be credited to Adam’s son Cain, for the opened the way of 
unjust killing to humanity” (Bukhari, Diyet 2, Enbiya 1; Muslim, Kasame 27). And “If 
anyone kills a man who had made a covenant will not experience the fragrance of paradise” 
(Bukhari, Tibb 19).  
Also, “Islam forbids suicide (intihar), stressing that it is not part of the jihad 
discourse in Sharia and that it is a major sin” (Zeidan 2001:20). Today, “extreme 
fundamentalists have revived the Khariji and Isma’ili assassin traditions of suicide-killings 
as a legitimate weapon in their contemporary jihad. This is especially true of Shia 
fundamentalists” (Zeidan 2001:20). However, the following Hadith is the response to this 
indiscriminate violent act: “He who throws himself from a mountain and kills himself will 
be thrown down in the fire of hell and remain in it for ever and ever; he who sips poison and 
 76 
kills himself will have his poison in his hand will sip it for ever and ever in the fire of hell” 
(Bukhari, Tibb 56; Müslim, Iman 175; Tirmizi, Tibb 7; Nesâi, Cenâiz 68, (4, 66, 67); Ebu 
Dâvud, Tibb 11). Human life in Islam as well as in other revealed religions is very sacred 
and valuable (Qur’an, 5:32, 17:70). For example, the Prophet shows greatest value given to 
humanity in Islam and its measures in the following story: “The Messenger of God was 
passing a Jewish funeral and he stopped to pay his respects. When reminded that the man 
being buried was a Jew, Muhammad replied, he is still human though” (Gulen 2002:98). In 
fact, a true believer cannot be an object of this question: “Do you then believe in a part of the 
Book and disbelieve in the other?” (Qur’an, 2:85). 
Consequently, while this was the measure of the Prophet’s respect for people, what 
lies behind the people or institution(s) getting involved in violent acts?  In fact, for example, 
Israeli helicopters slaughtering Muslim civilians as they sit in their living rooms does not 
justify the 16 year old girl who killed herself as a suicide bomber, slaughtering Israeli 
children as they enjoy a meal with their parents in a restaurant in Jerusalem. While doing 
this, did she not know those Qur’anic or the Prophetic teachings? What is the difference 
between this girl and Japanese kamikazes? In the stereotype, every thrown stone should not 
be thrown as response which is made in the name of religion, and also Islam’s teachings 
should not be victimized. “No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another” (Qur’an, 
6:164, 17:15). Whatever she means in her deed, her action is wrong and unacceptable by 
Islamic law. Therefore, not everyone who calls himself or herself a Muslim is a Muslim to 
the same extent that everyone who thinks of himself or herself as a Jew or a Christian is one. 
“Just as Islam is not a religion of terrorism, any Muslim who correctly understands Islam 
cannot be thought of as terrorists” (Gulen 2002:98).  
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Any terrorist attack, for example, either in the Algerian civil war or in the 
Palestine-Israel conflict or on September 11th in the United States cannot be justified or 
covered by any religion. Terrorism must be punished. For these kinds of crimes, regardless 
of the religious or political convictions of the perpetrators, Muslim jurists demanded the 
harshest penalties, including death. Most important, Muslim jurists held that the penalties are 
the same whether the perpetrator or victim is Muslim or non-Muslim. Islam stands totally 
opposed to the force against the rights of others. Rights of human beings are defined by 
Islamic law and are protected by this law which embraces not only Muslims but also 
followers of other religions who are considered as “People of the Book (ahl al-kitab).” If 
there is nevertheless violation in Islamic society, it is due not to the teachings of Islam but 
the imperfection of the human recipients of the Divine Message.  
Accordingly, reason of a violent action “should be sought not in Islam but within 
those people themselves, in their misinterpretations and in a result of so many negative 
social, political, and economic factors. In fact, fundamentalism or radicalism has “surged 
since the 1970s in the Middle East and North Africa (e.g., Algeria) because of the failure of 
Arab nationalism, the use of oil money to create dependent rentier states, the success of the 
Iranian revolution in 1979, and an omnipresent nation-state structure that blocks all outlets 
of legitimate protest” (Lawrence 2000:89). Alongside these facts, however, “the application 
of dual standards of justice and human rights” fuels terrorism.  “Dual standards invariably 
rankle in the human breast, and breed resentments that permit terrorism to breathe” (Fein 
1996). All religions assert that a real peace is attained only when justice prevails. So, justice 
must be first sought because if happened, peace would automatically follow it (Safi 2002:24-
30). 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1. Comparative implications  
 In comparing the evolution of the current struggle between Islamic opposition and 
the state, my research questions were grounded in the following assumption: The positive 
relationship between the pressure and tendency to radicalism and violence does not always 
work in every sphere because other factors may play formative role to prevent people from 
being violent. Using Algeria and Turkey, I examined why and how Algerian Islamic groups 
became involved in a civil war and why Turkey was not like Algeria. The findings were 
related to the different interpretations of the traditional Islamic concepts. This result 
confirms my hypothesis. The response to the repression and secular state policies is 
accordingly the function of the differences in the interpretations of Islamic sources.  
All the problems stem from the confusion of the textual interpretation of the classical 
doctrines and concepts such as jahiliyyah and jihad. Some reasons for their false and 
untenable interpretations (ta’wel and tafsir) were (al-Alwani 1993:2021): 
a) Undervaluing the purpose behind the Islamic texts or injunctions in the 
circumstances that were revealed or mentioned.  
b) Interpretation based on pure conjecture such as the interpretations of the esoteric 
sects such as the Mu’tazilah and Khariji.  
c) Interpretations based on the ideological tendencies because of the sociopolitical 
culture in which they exist. 
As Amina Wadud-Muhsin points out “when one individual reader with a particular 
world-view and specific prior text (language and cultural context in which the text is read) 
asserts that his or her reading is the only possible or permissible one, it prevents readers in 
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different contexts from coming to terms with their own relationship to the text” (quoted in 
Kurzman 1999:3), every individual or society will interpret and approach what was said in 
terms of the frame of the era, geography, and circumstance they lived in and the pressures 
they were subject to. In fact, there are two examples: on the one side Turkish Muslims’s 
moderate and constructive understanding and interpretation of Islamic texts, and as a result 
nonviolent struggle, on the other side the reactionary understanding of Algerian people and 
as its violent consequence.  
 In Algeria, the behavior and attitudes which have favored the use of violence were 
shaped by the radical re-interpretations of the influential scholars and thinkers such as Ibn 
Taymiyyah, Abd al-Wahhab, Ali Shariati, Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, and others who insisted 
on strict adherence to the literal interpretations of the religious concepts. The distinguishing 
characteristic for Turkey is its distance from the radical reinterpretations of these scholars 
and thinkers. Algerian people’s deviant interpretation and understanding of Islam is a result 
of their continuing reactionist behavior and attitude. Their first (tribal rebellion) reactions 
took on a religious nature against the Ottoman Turks, and then against the non-Muslim 
French. In contrast to Algerian reactionary culture, Turkish Muslims have been influenced 
by the pillars of affection and tolerance.  
While religion in Algeria frequently became a mobilizing force for political 
opposition against the central control and foreign control, in Turkey it was an internal 
component of the political process. The colonial experience in Algeria particularly has 
contributed not only to the more violent and anti- foreign (Western) tone of the Islamic 
movement, but also to the tension between the role of Islam and the secular institutions in 
the country. The traditional religious concepts which played a key role in mobilizing the 
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independence movement against the French were the catalyst for the indiscriminate violent 
culture in the postcolonial secularized time.  
The findings indicated that the reason for the rise of the political Islam in Turkey was 
not ideological appeal. In the clash of the religious and secular values, the religion or 
religious reaction is not showed as the greatest problem of the country (0.5% in 2002) (see 
Table 4 at Appendix B). The growing anxiety about the rise of the political Islam or the 
assumption of the secular Kemalist circle about the followers of the Welfare Party after the 
military interruption was the fear of violence in Algeria which was continuing at this time 
and on the change of the status quo within the Kemalist system. Contrary to Algerians, 
Turkish Muslim voters never indicate a monolithic block toward “one” party. They always 
express the ir political, social and economic discontentment in the all- rightist parties (Heper 
1997:33, 35) (Also, see Table 1 at Appendix B).  
More importantly, the sociopolitical and cultural background of each country played 
a significant role in the conflict and conflict management. Turkey is incomparable with 
Algeria because it has affluent cultural heritages from the Seljuks and Ottomans. In contrast 
to Algeria’s thirty years in the post- independence period, Turkey was never colonized and 
never subject to imperial rule or domination in its history (Lewis 1994:5; Koru 1997) 
Although its political pluralism and greater measure of public liberty began in 1946, its 
modernization and democratization go back to the Ottoman reforms in 19th century when 
Algeria was living under the French colonization culture that would create an identity crisis 
in the future. While the conflict as a result of the modernization thesis could mean 
opportunity as a constructive social and political change for Turkish Muslims, for Algerians 
it led to a destructive address that would carry them in the civil war.  
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 Another distinguishing feature for Turkey is its free-choice of integration with the 
West over the last 80 years. The statistics show that this integration is not only at the 
leadership level like Algeria or other Arab countries, but it is also at the societal level. This 
characteristic helped the emergence of a “new Turkey” with the “neo-Ottoman vision”. The 
emerging of the “neo-Ottomanism” at the societal level pushes the transformation of the 
Kemalist system into new charter under the “Anatolian culture” (Yavuz 1999). Going 
towards social and political contract, Turkey is now moving from “secular state with secular 
politics” to “secular state with religious politics” combination that is mostly practiced in the 
United States. 
 However, while there was no objective analysis of the situation in Algeria either in 
the media coverage, nor in the search for the truth, it would be unjust to make Islamists and 
Islamic groups alone responsible and to exonerate the regime’s forces (Imposimato 2001). 
The responsibility is in fact mutual, and each partly played an important part in this civil 
war. In the beginning of the conflict in Algeria “there has always existed a hidden centre of 
power that has acted with extreme cynicism in order to shape the course of events” 
(Imposimato 2001:5). The invisible groups on both sides were on the lookout for an 
opportunity and already ready to split up. The army was responsible as well as the GIA for 
the escalating cycle of the violence and brutality in the country (Imposimato 2001:2). In this 
sense, Habib Souaidia, a former officer of an elite unit of the Algerian army (ANP) wrote his 
experiences fighting against the armed Islamist groups between 1992 and 1995 in his book, 
The Dirty War (La Sale Guerre), describes the “invisible power” used by few groups in 
order to keep their status in the regime against the FIS’s victory. He recounts how several 
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armed radical groups were created in order to sabotage the victory of the FIS and to stop 
the electoral process.  
 Consequently, although Turkey and Algeria share some similarities in the patterns of 
the conflict evolution, their political culture and characteristics of their opposition 
movements in historical and cultural perspectives are considerably different (Koru 1997). 
The national and international statistics show that Turkey is culturally, socially, politically, 
and economically more developed and modernized country than Algeria. So, if Turkey is 
compared with a Muslim country, this one should not be Algeria or any country in the North 
Africa or the Middle East. Today, Turkey’s Islamic political parties resemble the Europe’s 
Christian Democrat parties. The Justice and Development (AK Party) is its evidence. 
7.2. Possible considerations for the U.S. Administration 
 The facts shows that while the traumatic Algerian civil war in the end of the last 
century was the reflection of the domestic threat of terrorism, the attacks of September 11, 
2001 that have been standing on the threshold of becoming the greatest tragedy of the 
beginning of the 21st century were the threat of the global terrorism. –interestingly both done 
under the guise of Islamic religion. But, as “Islamic history makes abundantly clear, Islam, 
in law and theology as well as in practice, always rejected or marginalized extremists and 
terrorists from the Kharijis and Assassins (Isma’ilis) to contemporary radical movements 
such as al-Qaeda” (Esposito: 2002:128). Indeed, there is no harshness and bigotry in Islam. 
It is entirely a religion of forgiveness and tolerance. The moderation and balance is not only 
a general characteristic of Islam but is also a fundamental landmark.  
The upheavals of the past few decades in the Middle East and North Africa and 
especia lly movements using the name of Islam and seeking to solve problems of the Muslim 
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world were created by conditions and causes beyond the control of Muslim society. Like 
some scholars have observed, the liberal evolution of political Islam in the Islamic world 
faces some formidable obstacles that come from internal and external political scenes 
including the Israel-Palestine conflict and most significantly the support or green light of the 
United States as well as European countries for the oppressive and corrupted regimes and 
state practices in the name of stability or material interests (that happened, for example, in 
Algeria) (Fuller 2002:51). Alongside this fact, societies were forced to adopt alien 
proselytizing values and to participate the constructing and/or sharing a “deep faith in the 
future”. Accordingly, the result has been that these societies became suspicious of Western 
modernization.  
 In parallel aspect, as Bediuzzaman (1993) asserted, today’s Muslims’s problem is 
laziness, lack of education, and poverty. However, throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa the principal object of reform is the states, rather than the societies. Regardless of 
what some Muslim and non-Muslim intellectuals claimed, the source of the problem is 
regularly sought out in the “other”, rather than in “our”. The solution to the problems is 
sought from the exterior, rather than inside.  
 These are some obstacles for Muslim and foreign policy makers. However, history 
has some breaking and turning points. Especially after September 11, 2001, the countries in 
the Islamic world were challenged with such realities. The recent developments gave such 
feedback that the way to a better future lies through the recognition of pluralism, the 
adoption of open social and political systems, and the establishment of democratic 
governance system throughout the Islamic world (Kubba 1996:89). In fact, opposite to the 
“clash of civilizations” thesis of Samuel P. Huntington (1993), the ongoing development 
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shows that war is globally not between the West and East, but rather between the 
fundamentalists and the moderates in particularly Islamic countries.  
 The potential rise of liberalization in the Muslim world will not only change political 
Islam itself, but also the human understanding of Islam. However, the vocabulary of change 
is universal. Being realistic, this change also depends on the West’s attitudes and behavior. 
Alongside this fact, it is unnecessary to talk about the dangers of religious organizations and 
movements without solving the Israel-Palestine holy conflict in the region. Certainly, if good 
governance of a state and society is premised on the rule of law, the “cocktail of disasters” in 
the region is not again consumed, but also automatically follows this change throughout the 
renewal of the cultural tradition. So, as opposed to what some Western scholars think, like 
Fuller (2002) said, before other’s problems become our problems such as the September 11 
attacks, the encouragement of such liberal and moderate trends rather than of keeping the 
old-age authoritarian regimes for such reasons should be a considerable and consequential 
objective of the U.S. foreign policy; where the moderate Islamic organizations and 
movements were viewed as the threat to the old authoritarian regimes rather than as 
advocates of democratization and modernization, there was no economic, social, and 
political stability. In order to effectively limit and restrain the domestic and global 
extremism and terrorism, a reexamination and reformulation of the “neocon style” foreign 
policy is necessary. In fact, throughout history ideologies could not be defeated by military, 
but only intellectually and educationally. So, regardless of self-centeredness, the short-term 
policies that were necessitated by national interests should be balanced by long-term 
policies.  
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 In doing that, consequently, it is not only our moral duty, but also a political 
necessity to re-establish the truth about such phenomenon. Such a truth avoids the traps of 
manipulation. The responsibility is mutual. Time is a gift to take lessons from and the history 
suggests not being foolish to engage in a new “dirty” war. From Bediuzzaman’s point of 
view, “the civilized are to be conquered by persuasion not by force” (1960:78). Rather than 
cursing darkness, we should try to light a candle for the road through a peaceful world. The 
solution begins an “intercivilizational dialogue”, rather than a “clash of civilizations”.  
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS 
Ayah (pl. ayaat): Literally, sign, indication, message; aspect of God’s creation; a 
section of the Qur’anic text often referred to as a ‘verse’.  
Caliph (Khilafath): Stewardship, vicegerency; successorship. Office of the (political 
and religious) head of the Muslim state. The designation of the political system of the state 
after the Prophet Muhammad.  
Fatwa: Formal legal opinion or decision of a mufti or religious leader on a matter of 
Islamic law.  
Fiqh: Literally means the true understanding of what was intended and technically 
refers to the science of deducing Islamic Laws from evidence found in the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah. The term fiqh is sometimes used synonymously with Shari’ah or Islamic law.  
Hadith: Narrative report of the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and actions. 
Ijma: Means the consensus of opinion of the scholars (ulema) on any point of law 
not specified in the first source the Qur’an and  Sunnah; or agreement of the community; a 
source of Islamic law. Also, it is described as collective ijtihad.  
Ijtihad:  Literally, striving and self-exertion; independent reasoning; analytical 
thought; interpretation of Islamic law. It is a form of analogical deductions based on 
evidence found either in the Qur’an, Sunnah or Ijmâ. Ijtihad may involve the interpretation 
of the source materials, inference of rulers from them, or giving a legal verdict or decision 
on any issue on which there is no specific guidance in the Qur’an and Sunnah.  
Imam: Leader. The term refers to the leader of congregational prayer (namaz), to a 
leading and reputable scholar, or to the head of the Muslim community. 
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Islamism: The term is used with same meaning as political Islam. It refers to the 
discourse and activities that give Islam a central political role and aim to reorganize society 
according to what are believe to be Islamic principles and Islamic law. Therefore, it is 
viewed as a political ideology that wants to set up an Islamic state with a constitutional 
framework and political organization.  
Islamists: By “Islamists” I mean a “specific group” of people who want to practice 
Islam in their daily life as well as promote it into the political arena. The term Islamist does 
not refer the meaning of “radical” and “fundamentalist”. The term is used with same 
meaning as “religious challenger”, “revivalist”, “religious (group)”, “Islamic reformist”, and 
“modernist (Muslim intellectual)”. Islamists aim to reinterpret Islam to meet the changing 
circumstances of contemporary life.  In addition, some of them seek separation of the 
religious and secular institutions in order to deal with conflict between themselves and 
opponent groups.  
Jahiliyyah:  Period of ignorance, i.e., pre-Islamic Arabia, used by contemporary 
revivalists to refer to un-Islamic behavior and attitudes in society. 
Jihad: Literally struggle, effort and striving. Any earnest striving in the way of God, 
involving either personal effort, material resources, or arms for righteousness and against 
evil, wrongdoing and oppression. Where it involves arms struggle, it must be for the defense 
of faith, or just war to protect even non-Muslim community from any kind of evil  
Kafir , kufr and kuffar: Unbeliever or infidel, one who is rejects the message of 
religion. 
Kemalist circle: Refers to the Turkish military, professional organizations, 
academia, parties at left wing, and some sections of the civil bureaucracy. 
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Khariji: Seceders. Name given to a group of the followers of the caliphs Ali who 
opposed his decision to agree to arbitration in the conflict with Muawiyah in 659 AC. Later 
on, this group became recognized as legitimate to only the first two caliphs. Abu Baker and 
Umar. Theologically, they considered the sinner as a kafir (unbeliever), an outlaw or 
apostate, whom it is legitimate and religiously imperative to fight.  
Madhab: Religious sect, school of thought, one of the schools of Islamic law and 
theology. 
Maslaha: Public interest or welfare. 
Mufti: Specialist on Islamic law competent to deliver a fatwa or legal interpretation 
or brief. 
Mujahidin: People who fight under the name of jihad. Soldier of God.   
Opponent group: The “opponent group is commonly itself the state apparatus, 
controlled by an elite that is seen as hostile and injurious to the welfare and interests of wider 
population.  Another meaning of the term is frequently a non-state body which is backed by 
the State apparatus”. The opponent “has usually significant administrative, economic, 
political, police, and military capacity” (Sharp 2002:4). In light of the term “opponent 
group,” I used the following terms for opponent caused the conflict as “secularists”, “ruling 
class”, “ruling elite”, “governing regime”, “state”, “Kemalist ideology” or “Kemalists”. 
However, I sometimes used the term opponent for religious challengers according to the 
context.  
 Radicalism: The meaning of radical refers to supporting complete political or social 
change. In our case it describes someone or a group that is rigid in their views of Islamic 
Law and of non-Islamic cultures.  
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 Radical Islam(ists): The use of the term “Islamist” is separated from the term of 
“fundamentalism” or “traditionalism”. Islamic traditionalism or fundamentalism, Abootalebi 
writes, generally “urges passive adherence to literal reading of scriptures and does not 
advocate change of the social order, instead focusing on reforming the lives of the individual 
and family (1999:105). Both fundamentalism and traditionalism refer in this paper to 
“radical Islam”. The radical Islam or Islamists, radical group, and/or fundamentalists are 
“used here interchangeably as referring to opposition” to modernists, reformists, Islamists, 
religious challengers or/and revivalist groups, who are “much less rigid in their views of 
Islamic Law (Shari’a) and of non-Islamic cultures” (Abootalebi 1999:105).  
 Salafi: Forebears, predecessors, ancestors. The early generations of the Muslim 
community, including the Companions (Sahâbah) and the Tâbi’ùn. But, today this term is 
used for people who are too strict in literal interpretation of Islamic sources and practice. 
Like Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism.  
Shari’ah: Islamic law; path.  
Secular State Policy: Secular policy means any policy directed towards separating 
religion from state affairs and allowing people to live their religion freely without affecting 
public life. In this paper, however, the secular state policy means such policies that may refer 
to deviations from the original concept of secularism, to eliminate the Islamic symbols from 
the society, to root out the Islamic tradition and culture from the society, and to forbid 
people to enjoy their religious freedom even if this does not interfere with order and 
tranquility in society. 
Shii: Follower of Shia sect. Those Muslims who believe Muhammad designated Ali 
and his rightful descendants to be the true leaders of the Muslim community.  
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Shura: Consultation. 
Sufi: Follower of Sufism, Islamic mysticism.  
Sunnah: Literally means a way, practice, rule of life, and refers to the exemplary 
conduct or the model behavior of the Prophet in what he said, did, or approved. 
Takfir: Excommunication, the proclaiming of a fellow believer as an infidel. 
Tafsir: Refers to the explanation, clarification, interpretation, and commentary of the 
Qur’an.  
Ta’wil: Interpretation or explanation. Sometimes used synonymously with tafsir.  
Ulema: Religious scholars or clergy.  
Ummah: Community, nation. Specifically, it refers to the worldwide Muslim 
community. 
Urf (Custom): Used as a source of the Islamic law in a given region as long as they 
did not contradict any of the principles of Shari’a. 
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APPENDIX B: TABLES FOR THE SURVEY RESULTS 
 
Table 1: The demand for the Shari’ah system           
 Number  Percentage 
Want 179 9,9 
Don’t want 1097 60,7 
Don’t opinion, no answer  531 29,4 
Total 1807 100,0 
Source: TUSES 2002: 22-23.  
 
Table 2: The support for the membership of Turkey to the EU 
 1998 2002 
Want 61.8 57.7 
Don’t want 16.7 24.0 
No opinion, no answer 19.7 15.5 
Depends on condition 1.8 2.8 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Source: TUSES 2002: 35-38 
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Table 3: Party preferences and religiosity 
Parties Never  Not too much Religious  Somewhat  Too much  No opinion 
MP (ANAP) 2.10 8.68 60.78 23.65 4.49 0.30 
PRP (CHP) 8.19 25.15 47.95 15.20 1.75 1.75 
DLP (DSP) 2.68 11.63 58.39 22.37 3.13 1.79 
WP-VP (RP-FP) 0.25 8.60 40.86 36.55 14.21 1.52 
PDP (HADEP) - 39.13 47.83 8.70 4.39 - 
NAP (MHP) 0.69 6.90 63.45 24.83 4.14 - 
TPP (DYP) 1.36 6.82 56.36 27.27 7.73 0.45 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Toprak, Binnaz & Carkoglu, Ali. 1999. The religion, Society, and Politics in Turkey.  Istanbul: TESEV, p.43. 
  
Table 4: What is the most problem of Turkey? 
 
Problem 1994 1996 1998 2002 
High cost of living, economy, inflation 36.9 46.7 46.1 53.2 
Terror, security 45.0 16.7 11.9 1.7 
Unemployment 10.4 12.0 10.7 24.0 
Governmental administration 1.0 4.3 7.2 7.8 
Foreign politics 0.6 2.3 1.2 2.3 
Democracy and human rights 11.1 12.2 12.3 11.5 
Education 0.6 1.6 2.2 1.9 
Corruption    11.1 
Religious reaction 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.5 
Other 3.0 3.4 7.7 1.8 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: TUSES 2002: 16-17. 
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Table 5: The second choice of other party voters for the AK Party 
Party Percentage 
Peace Party (SP): Islamist  57.0 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP): Nationalist, Conservative 30.5 
Motherland Party (ANAP): Liberal, Conservative 16.7 
True Path Party (DYP): Liberal, Conservative 16.8 
Democrat Left Party (DSP): Social Democrat, Nationalist 10.8 
People’s Republican Party (CHP): Leftist 1.4 
People’s Democratic Party (HADEP): Ethnic (Kurt) nationalist, leftist 1.2 
Source: The supporter and voter profile of the political parties in Turkey (1994-2002). Istanbul: TUSES Publication, 2002. 
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APPENDIX C: MAPS OF TURKEY AND ALGERIA 
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